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1801 
Article 
The Free Speech Rights of University 
Students 
Mary-Rose Papandrea† 
In March 2014, University of Oklahoma President David 
Boren reacted swiftly when a video surfaced online revealing 
members of the SAE fraternity singing a racist song1 on a bus. 
Two young men leading the singing were immediately expelled. 
Boren explained in a letter to the students that they had been 
expelled due to their “leadership role in leading a racist and ex-
clusionary chant which has created a hostile educational envi-
ronment for others.”2 Several prominent First Amendment 
scholars denounced the expulsions, arguing that the racist 
speech was entitled to constitutional protection.3 
 
†  Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, University of 
North Carolina School of Law. Copyright © 2017 by Mary-Rose Papandrea. 
 1. The song is set to the tune of “If You’re Happy and You Know It,” and 
appears to contain the following lyrics: 
There will never be a . . . SAE 
There will never be a . . . SAE 
You can hang ’em from a tree 
But he’ll never [inaudible—possibly “sign”] with me 
There will never be a . . . SAE. 
Matt Pearce, Is University of Oklahoma Frat’s Racist Chant Protected by 1st 
Amendment?, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na 
-oklahoma-fraternity-explainer-20150310-story.html#page=1. 
 2. Manny Fernandez & Erik Eckholm, Expulsion of Two Oklahoma Stu-
dents over Video Leads to Free Speech Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/12/us/expulsion-of-two-oklahoma-students 
-leads-to-free-speech-debate.html?_r=0. 
 3. See, e.g., id. (summarizing views of prominent First Amendment ex-
perts); Pearce, supra note 1 (quoting experts stating that the speech is pro-
tected); Eugene Volokh, No, It’s Not Constitutional for University of Oklahoma 
To Expel Students for Racist Speech [UPDATED in Light of Students’ Expul-
sion], WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/10no-a-public 
-university-may-not-expel-students-for-racist-speech. 
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All around the country, colleges and universities are in-
creasingly punishing or censoring students who engage in of-
fensive speech. While concerns that a failure to act will lead to 
liability under federal anti-discrimination law may offer a par-
tial explanation for this conduct, in many instances the possi-
bility of liability is weak or non-existent. Except in the most ex-
treme circumstances, schools are not required to expel students 
for their speech in order to avoid liability. Instead, schools ap-
pear to punish students for their expressive activities in order 
to demonstrate a steadfast commitment to fostering a tolerant 
and inclusive environment.4 
The question this Article seeks to address is whether the 
First Amendment affords public institutions of higher educa-
tion special latitude to punish students for their offensive 
speech.5 Although universities are frequently recognized as the 
“quintessential marketplace of ideas,”6 arguments that public 
colleges and universities have—or should have—some measure 
of institutional academic freedom to restrict offensive speech 
have been gaining traction. Around the country, public colleges 
and universities have been asserting broad authority to punish 
or restrict their students’ speech and associational rights.7 In 
 
 4. PEN America’s October 2016 report summarizes the current debate as 
one raising “serious questions about how rights to free speech, freedom of as-
sembly, and academic freedom intersect with the quest to address some of the 
most vexing challenges of diversity and inclusion faced by students, faculty, 
and administrators.” PEN AM., AND CAMPUS FOR ALL: DIVERSITY, INCLUSION, 
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH AT U.S. UNIVERSITIES 4 (2016), https://pen.org/sites/ 
default/files/PEN_campus_report_final_online_2.pdf [hereinafter PEN AM. 
REPORT]. The vice chancellor for legal affairs at UCLA has similarly observed 
that “[t]hese situations are very, very challenging for universities.” Pearce, su-
pra note 1 (quoting Kevin Reed’s explanation that “when there’s ‘conduct and 
behavior that makes members of the student body feel unsafe, unprotected, a 
subject of hate . . . universities have an obligation to act to try to remedy that 
situation, to prevent it . . . . Balancing that obligation with the 1st Amendment 
is the university’s challenge’”). 
 5. This Article will focus on public colleges and universities because the 
First Amendment does not apply at private institutions of higher education. 
To the extent that private institutions look to First Amendment doctrine for 
guidance, however, the analysis in this Article may be useful in that context as 
well. 
 6. Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 352 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Healy v. 
James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)). 
 7. Chad Flanders, Oklahoma Frat Case Touches on a Surprisingly 
Murky Area of Law, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.cleveland 
.com/opinion/index.ssf/2015/03/oklahoma_frat_case_touches_on.html (suggest-
ing the possibility that public university students have the same limited 
speech rights as public employees). 
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addition to punishing students for their non-curricular expres-
sion, like the University of Oklahoma example offered at the 
outset, public colleges and universities are increasingly punish-
ing students for their speech when it is deemed inconsistent 
with vague “professionalism” standards and imposing sweeping 
requirements that student-athletes essentially waive their 
First Amendment rights as a condition of participation in an 
extracurricular activity. 
This Article concludes that the authority of public universi-
ties to restrict student speech is, or at least should be, quite 
narrow. In reaching this conclusion, the Article confronts and 
rejects arguments that public universities should receive broad 
institutional deference to restrict student speech in the name of 
improving the educational environment. Any deference public 
universities receive must be limited to speech that occurs in the 
context of academic activities, and any such deference they do 
receive should not be absolute. 
Furthermore, this Article contends courts should resist the 
growing use (or misuse) of the government speech doctrine. 
Under the government speech doctrine, First Amendment re-
strictions do not apply when the government itself is speaking.8  
Although it should be clear that students, particularly college 
and university students, do not speak for the university, insti-
tutions of higher education are increasingly caving to various 
constituencies inside and outside of the university who believe 
that they do. Rather than appreciating the traditional role of 
the university as the quintessential marketplace of ideas, stu-
dents, alumni, and the public frequently appear to believe that 
whenever a school tolerates offensive speech, the university is 
endorsing those viewpoints.  
Part I of this Article outlines some of the recent issues in-
volving online student speech that have arisen in the higher 
education context, particularly in the age of social media. This 
initial Part outlines the potential for liability schools might face 
under federal statutes for creating or permitting hostile educa-
tional environments and concludes that fears of liability under 
these statutes cannot fully explain why universities are in-
creasingly less tolerant of offensive speech. Part II sets out the 
contours of traditional First Amendment doctrine, which offers 
robust protection for offensive speech except when it crosses the 
line into certain categories of unprotected or lesser-protected 
 
 8. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009). 
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speech. Part III expands on the doctrinal analysis of Part II 
with close consideration of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
relating to students in both the K–12 and higher education set-
ting. One of the key questions in this Part is whether the 
Court’s decisions in the K–12 context should have any applica-
tion in the higher education setting. This Part argues that the-
se cases should have little, if any, application when public col-
leges and universities have punished their students because 
the population and function of the two types of educational in-
stitutions are fundamentally different. Part IV focuses on the 
question of whether institutions of higher education should be 
given deference to punish speech that does not fit into their ed-
ucational mission. This Part concludes that such deference is 
dangerous and misplaced in the university environment. 
I.  STUDENT SPEECH TODAY   
Since at least the 1970s, universities have struggled to de-
termine whether to accommodate offensive speech on campus, 
and hate speech codes have been around since the 1980s.9 But 
today’s calls for greater control of speech on campus are argua-
bly even louder, stronger, and more robust than they have been 
in past decade, and arguably include demands to restrict much 
more speech. 
Public colleges and universities are struggling more than 
ever to balance their obligations under the First Amendment 
and their desire to create inclusive communities.10 While stu-
dent pressure to punish those who engage in offensive speech 
grows, so does a backlash to this pressure, echoed in the politi-
cal debates in our increasingly polarized society.11 The devel-
opment of e-mail, social media, and mobile phones has compli-
cated already complex questions about whether and when a 
 
 9. See Benjamin M. Welch, An Examination of University Speech Codes’ 
Constitutionality and Their Impact on High-Level Discourse 1–13 (Aug. 2014) 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Nebraska), http://digitalcommons.unl 
.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=journalismdiss (providing a 
history of university free speech codes). 
 10. See Susan Svrluga, Slurs, Blackface, and Gorilla Masks: The Academ-
ic Year Opened with Racial Ugliness, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/10/07/slurs 
-blackface-and-gorilla-masks-the-academic-year-opened-with-racial-ugliness/ 
?tid=hybrid_collaborative_1_na (describing various racially charged incidents 
on college campuses across the country, university responses, and subsequent 
societal debate). 
 11. Id. 
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university can—or even must—punish students for their digital 
expressive activities occurring both on and off campus, and in-
side and outside of the curricular setting.12 
In recent years, public colleges and universities have faced 
pressure to shut down social media websites and apps known to 
host offensive content. In past years, the most popular targets 
were Autoadmit.com13 and JuicyCampus.com;14 more recently, 
students around the country have asked administrators to 
block access to a popular mobile phone app Yik Yak.15 Yik Yak 
allows users to post anonymous messages to people within a 
small geographic radius. Although the app has some positive 
uses,16 it also has been used to call for the lynching of the black 
student body president, the gang rape at a university women’s 
center, and countless other offensive statements.17 
When universities can determine who is making offensive 
statements, then it faces calls to punish those students, and to 
do so quickly. The University of Oklahoma case mentioned at 
the outset of this Article is one example. Another occurred in 
September 2016 when Kansas State University expelled a stu-
dent who posted on Snapchat picture of herself using a cosmet-
ic clay mask with the racially offensive caption, “[f ]eels good to 
finally be a [racial slur].”18 Other universities have punished 
students for similar types of expression.19 
 
 12. Public colleges and universities also must grapple with professor and 
staff speech issues, but those issues are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 13. Ilana Seager, Law Graduates Settle Suit, YALE DAILY NEWS (Oct. 23, 
2009), http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2009/10/23/law-graduates-settle-suit. 
 14. Robert Shibley, Tennessee State Bans JuicyCampus.com from Net-
work, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC. (Nov. 20, 2008), https://www.thefire 
.org/Tennessee-state-bans-juicycampuscom-from-network. 
 15. Tasnim Shamma, Yik Yak Tests Universities’ Defense of Free Speech, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 23, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/ 
alltechconsidered/2016/01/23/463197593/yik-yak-tests-universities-defense-of 
-free-speech. 
 16. Amanda Hess, The Upside of Yik Yak, SLATE (Mar. 10, 2015), http:// 
www.slate.com/articles/technology/users/2015/03/yik_yak_the_anonymous_ 
messaging_app_with_a_terrible_rep_is_actually_pretty.html. 
 17. Shamma, supra note 15. 
 18. Susan Svrluga, “I Am Truly Sorry”: Student Apologizes for Snapchat 
Image that Had Racial Slur, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2016), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/09/18/i-am-truly-sorry-former 
-kansas-state-student-apologizes-for-snapchat-image-that-had-racial-slur. 
 19. Quinnipiac expelled a student who posted on Snapchat a picture of a 
friend wearing a cosmetic clay mask with the caption “Black Lives Matter.” 
Leigh Frillici, Student No Longer at Quinnipiac After Posting Racially Insensi-
tive Snapchat Photo, WTNH NEWS 8 (Sept. 21, 2016), http://wtnh.com/ 
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To be sure, not all universities respond with immediate ex-
pulsions. A quick look at how various public and private uni-
versities have handled these situations reveals the range of 
possibilities. For example, when a UCLA student posted a video 
mocking “Asians in the Library,”20 UCLA responded with a 
statement from the Chancellor condemning the video.21 UCLA 
did not expel the student, although the student withdrew any-
way after apologizing and citing concerns for her own safety on 
campus.22 But even UCLA has become quicker to punish stu-
dents for their offensive speech as student demands for the 
punishment of speakers have grown more strident.23 
 
2016/09/21/quinnipiac-student-no-longer-with-quinnipiac-after-posting 
-racially-insensitive-snapchat-photo. Several students at the University of 
North Dakota posted pictures of themselves in clay masks with the same cap-
tion, “Black Lives Matter.” Jack Jenkins, White North Dakota Students Dress 
in Blackface, Post Picture with Caption ‘Black Lives Matter,’ THINKPROGRESS 
(Sept. 24, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/north-dakota-blackface 
-1a2233a5e24f#.mrpq2q3r4. Around the same time, another group of students 
stole their roommate’s phone and posted a picture of themselves on her 
Snapchat account with the caption, “[w]e locked the black bitch out!” Peter 
Holley, ‘Inexcusible’: Students’ Photos, One in Blackface, Trigger Backlash and 
University Investigation, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/09/26/inexcusable-students 
-blackface-photos-trigger-backlash-university-investigation. These expulsions 
also raise serious due process concerns as well. One can only speculate that 
some universities have decided that appearing to be sympathetic to calls for 
an “inclusive” and “safe” environment are worth the subsequent costs of violat-
ing constitutional rights. 
 20. SirBigDickNigga, Asians in the Library: UCLA Rant (Original Uncut 
Video) and Apology, YOUTUBE (Mar. 13, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=zQR01qltgo8. 
 21. Gene D. Block, Chancellor Block Appalled by Student Video Disparag-
ing Asians, UCLA NEWSROOM (Mar. 14, 2011), http://newsroom.ucla.edu/ 
stories/chancellor-block-statement-199032. The university communicated its 
message both through a statement as well as a video of its own that it posted 
on YouTube. UCLA, UCLA Chancellor Appalled by Student Video, YOUTUBE 
(Mar. 14, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6feGp0GQVJ8. Other stu-
dents also responded with their own videos. See, e.g., Jimmy Wong, Ching 
Chong! Asians in the Library Song (Response to UCLA’s Alexandra Wallace), 
YOUTUBE (Mar. 15, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zulEMWj3sVA. 
 22. Kate Parkinson-Morgan, Alexandra Wallace Apologizes, Announces 
She Will No Longer Attend UCLA, DAILY BRUIN (Mar. 18, 2011), http:// 
dailybruin.com/2011/03/18/alexandra_wallace_apologizes_announces_she_ 
will_no_longer_attend_ucla. 
 23. Conor Friedersdorf, The Anti-Free-Speech Movement at UCLA, THE 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/ 
the-anti-free-speech-movement-at-ucla/410638. In October 2015, the universi-
ty suspended a fraternity and sorority for holding a mixer called “Kanye West-
ern” in which partygoers dressed as Kanye West and Kim Kardashian. Some 
of those dressing as Kanye apparently wore baggy clothes and soot on their 
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Some scholars have argued that universities need to pun-
ish students who engage in offensive speech online to avoid lia-
bility under Title VI and Title IX. All universities are subject to 
these federal anti-discrimination laws. Title IX provides in per-
tinent part that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the 
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educa-
tional program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance.”24 The Court has held this statute supports a private 
cause of action alleging hostile environment harassment.25 In 
order for a college or university to be liable, a plaintiff must 
show that the conduct at issue is “so severe, pervasive, and ob-
jectively offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from 
the victims’ educational experience, that the victim-students 
are effectively denied equal access to an institution’s resources 
and opportunities.”26 In addition, the plaintiff must prove the 
institution had “actual knowledge” of this conduct and acted in 
a manner suggesting “deliberate indifference.”27 Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, or national origin in “any program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance.”28 The Supreme Court has 
held that like Title IX, Title IV supports a private cause of ac-
tion alleging intentional discrimination.29 
Schools’ exposure to liability under federal law for permit-
ting the existence of a hostile educational environment is much 
narrower than many universities might realize. Speech is not 
actionable unless it creates a hostile environment that is “se-
 
faces (it is not clear this was blackface); those dressing as Kim wore big fake 
butts. When pictures of the party appeared on social media, some students 
claimed the costumes were racist. The partygoers claimed they were mocking 
pop culture by dressing up as specific people; they claim no one wore blackface 
but rather were dressed up as miners with soot on their faces. UCLA issued a 
statement: “While we do not yet have all the facts, the alleged behavior is in-
consistent with good judgment as well as our principles of community.” See 
Veronica Rocha, Kanye West-Themed Frat Party at UCLA Sparks Protest, 
Claims of Racism, L.A TIMES (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/ 
lanow/la-me-ln-ucla-blackface-kanye-party-20151008-story.html. 
 24. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). 
 25. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
 26. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999). 
 27. Id. at 642–43. 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012). 
 29. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279–80 (2001) (holding private 
parties may sue under Title VI to challenge intentional discrimination and 
that disparate impact claims are not cognizable). 
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vere or pervasive.”30 A single, isolated instance of speech does 
not generally give rise to a hostile environment claim unless it 
is “extraordinarily severe.”31 The offensiveness of the speech is 
evaluated under an objective reasonable person standard.32 A 
few Title VII cases in the lower courts involving employees who 
display the Confederate flag are instructive. In these cases, the 
hostile environment claims generally lost, for several possible 
reasons: employers were unable to demonstrate that the Con-
federate flag actually disrupted the workplace;33 the speaker’s 
co-workers were not exposed to the speech in the workplace;34 
and no reasonable person could be offended by the flag accom-
panied by the words “[h]eritage, not [h]ate.”35 Furthermore, un-
like employers, university officials are not as likely to face the 
dilemma of retaining an employee, particularly a supervisor, 
who engages in offensive speech that might be used down the 
road to support a negligent retention claim or discrimination 
lawsuit.36 
In the context of discussing the University of Oklahoma 
video, Professor Noah Feldman has argued that “[g]iven that 
the speech was literally designed to inculcate the value of racial 
discrimination by making pledges recite their commitment 
never to admit a black member to the fraternity . . . [r]emoving 
the chant leaders from campus is aimed to fulfill the educa-
 
 30. Mormol v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 364 F.3d 54, 57 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 31. See, e.g., id. at 59 (“It is . . . ‘well settled in this Circuit that even a 
single act’ [can create a hostile environment if it is] ‘extraordinarily severe’ 
. . . .” (citing Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 570 (2d Cir. 2000))). 
 32. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). 
 33. Carpenter v. City of Tampa, No. 8:03 CV 451 T 17 EAJ, 2005 WL 
1463206 (M.D. Fla. June 21, 2005) (holding employee had First Amendment 
right to leave Confederate flag decal on his private vehicle). 
 34. Greer v. City of Warren, Civ. No. 1:10-cv-01065, 2012 WL 1014658 
(W.D. Ark. Mar. 23, 2012) (holding a police officer had a First Amendment 
right to post the Confederate flag at his private residence and on his private 
MySpace page, given the lack of evidence that his co-workers were exposed to 
the flag in the workplace); Erickson v. City of Topeka, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 
1138 (D. Kan. 2002). 
 35. Erickson, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1147; see also Clay v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., No. 13-2240-SAC, 2014 WL 5298173 (D. Kan. Oct. 15, 2014) 
(“Plaintiff complained about the flag, Defendant investigated it, found no ra-
cial animus, and concluded that the employee was free to display the flag in 
her car window. This was a reasonable conclusion which does not demonstrate 
race discrimination on the part of the employer.”). 
 36. Eugene Volokh, Deterring Speech: When Is It “McCarthyism”? When Is 
It Proper?, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1434–38 (2005) (explaining liability risks 
employers face if they retain employees who engage in racial or other offensive 
speech). 
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tional goal of creating a nonhostile educational environment.”37 
Feldman recognizes, however, that “[i]t’s a tricky question 
whether speech not directed at anyone in particular should be 
treated as conduct creating a hostile environment.”38 While 
some universities may punish offensive speech out of an excess 
of caution,39 it seems unlikely that a fear of liability offers a full 
explanation for the increasing punishment of offensive speech. 
Indeed, universities have cited other reasons for punishing 
offensive speech that have nothing at all to do with anti-
discrimination laws. For example, a recent trend among uni-
versities is to justify the punishment of students for offensive 
speech as incompatible with the student’s chosen profession.40 
For example, in 2010 a mortuary student at the University of 
Minnesota was placed on probation, received a failing grade in 
a class, and was forced to complete a psychiatric evaluation af-
ter she posted several sarcastic and joking comments about ca-
davers on her personal Facebook page. The Supreme Court of 
Minnesota upheld the university’s actions.41 The Tenth Circuit 
held that an acting program could exclude a student who refus-
es to use profanity, unless she can prove that religious discrim-
ination was a primary factor for the professors’ decision.42 More 
recently, the Eighth Circuit upheld a public college’s decision to 
remove a student from a nursing program for unprofessional 
 
 37. Noah Feldman, Balancing the First Amendment vs. Racist Chants at 
Oklahoma, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12, 2015, at C23. 
 38. See id.; see also Cristian Farias, The Two Oklahoma Students Expelled 
for Their Racist Chant Have a Strong Free Speech Defense, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/121269/oklahoma 
-fraternity-racist-video-shouldnt-get-students-expelled (expressing concern 
that the hostile environment justification is too malleable to satisfy First 
Amendment standards); See AMY GAJDA, THE TRIALS OF ACADEME 92 (2009) 
(“The difficulty for universities is that they are caught between expanding le-
gal protections for both free speech and nondiscrimination on campus, with 
relatively little reliable guidance from the courts about how the sometimes 
conflicting mandates are to be reconciled.”). 
 39. Of course, as Eugene Volokh has pointed out in the context of hostile 
environment claims in the employment context, an employer can’t just tell its 
employees, “you can generally make [offensive] statements, but not when they 
in the aggregate are so severe or pervasive as to create a hostile environment.” 
Eugene Volokh, Thinking Ahead About Freedom of Speech and Hostile Work 
Environment Harassment, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 305, 310 (1996). 
 40. For an excellent article on this trend, see Emily Gold Waldman, Uni-
versity Imprimaturs on Student Speech: The Certification Cases, 11 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 382 (2013). 
 41. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012). 
 42. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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conduct for sarcastic comments he made on his Facebook page 
relating to his frustrations with a group project and his fellow 
students’ failure to use mechanical pencils.43 The Ninth Circuit 
also recently relied on a “professionalism” standard when it 
upheld a school’s decision to reject a student from a student-
teaching program.44 
Universities have also stepped up their efforts to control 
the speech of their student-athletes.45 As a condition of partici-
pating in a sport, public university students must consent to 
the monitoring of their social media accounts and agree not to 
post anything on those accounts that would place the university 
in a bad light.46 Although these attempts to control athletes’ 
speech may, in some cases, be connected to improving team dy-
namics and performance, they also appear to be motivated by 
an interest in preventing these high-profile students from rep-
resenting the school in embarrassing or politically unpopular 
ways. For example, student athletes who chose to kneel during 
the playing of the national anthem to protest police killings of 
African Americans have come under a firestorm of criticism, 
with alumni and even state legislators threatening to cut off 
funding to the university and the athletic program.47 At East 
Carolina University (ECU), the university faced a firestorm of 
criticism from angry alumni threatening to end their financial 
support of the school after a number of football players kneeled 
during the National Anthem. Initially, the ECU Chancellor is-
sued a press release recognizing that although some fans may 
 
 43. Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d. 523 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 44. Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting a 
challenge to expulsion of a student based on his statements in a reflection as-
signment that he believed online child predation should be legal and that 
highly disabled students should not be mainstreamed). 
 45. Ken Paulson, Twitter Crackdowns Do College Athletes, Free Speech No 
Favors, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.firstamendmentcenter 
.org/twitter-crackdowns-do-college-athletes-free-speech-no-favors (summariz-
ing recent trends). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See, e.g., Associated Press, Arkansas Players Face Backlash After 
Kneeling During Anthem, USA TODAY (Nov. 8, 2016), http://sports.usatoday 
.com/2016/11/08/arkansas-players-face-backlash-after-kneeling-during-anthem 
-2 (reporting some Republican lawmakers threatened to cut off funding to the 
University of Arkansas sports program); Jane Stancill, ECU Faculty Groups 
Support Free Speech Rights After Band Protest, NEWS & OBSERVER (Nov. 2, 
2016), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/education/article112161412 
.html (reporting ECU Faculty Senate passed a resolution in favor of the stu-
dents after Chancellor received complaints from alumni threatening to cut off 
donations, and parents threatened to withdraw their students). 
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have been “disappoint[ed]” with the students’ kneeling, their 
protest was “part of the free exchange of ideas on a university 
campus.”48 Soon thereafter, however, other university officials, 
including the band director, director of the School of Music, and 
the dean for the School of Arts and Communications, issued a 
second press release indicating that the university would not 
respect the students’ exercise of their speech rights: “While we 
affirm the right of all our students to express their opinions, 
protests of this nature by the Marching Pirates will not be tol-
erated moving forward.”49 Even North Carolina Governor Pat 
McCrory condemned the students, asserting that “[t]hey have 
every right to express their First Amendment rights outside the 
stadium.”50 
Several commentators have offered theories for why large 
numbers of college students today are calling for speech re-
strictions on their campuses.51 Defenders of student activists 
contend that these students are continuing “the American tra-
dition of using free expression and civil disobedience to advance 
social change,” particularly given “the vital imperatives of ra-
cial and gender justice” that are important not just on colleges 
campuses but in society at large.52 These tensions might be 
magnified on campuses where student bodies are more diverse 
than ever, coming from “vastly different backgrounds, cultures, 
and levels of economic and even physical security.”53 In addi-
tion, some have argued that “political life and discourse is at 
the boiling point” with the election of President Trump, and 
 
 48. Statement from Dr. Cecil Stanton, Chancellor, E. Carolina Univ. (Oct. 
1, 2016), https://mgtvwnct.files.wordpress.com/2016/10/ecu-chancellor 
-statement.pdf. 
 49. See Jessica Chasmar, East Carolina University: Future Protests of Na-
tional Anthem ‘Will Not Be Tolerated,’ WASH. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www 
.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/oct/4/east-carolina-university-future 
-protests-of-nation. 
 50. Jane Stancill, ECU Band Protest Still Stoking Strong Emotions, NEWS 
& OBSERVER (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/ 
education/article106695287.html (reporting McCrory’s reelection campaign 
was distributing copies of his videotaped interview where he made this state-
ment). 
 51. Although surveys suggest students value free speech on college cam-
puses, alarmingly high numbers also say they would support speech re-
strictions on “racist, sexist, homophobic, or otherwise offensive” expression as 
well as restrictions on Halloween costumes based on offensive stereotypes. 
PEN AM. REPORT, supra note 4, at 13. 
 52. Id. at 5. 
 53. Id. at 13. 
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they may see “free speech” as a cover for attacks on marginal-
ized people.54 
Critics characterize activists as “coddled students” who 
have no tolerance for “dissent and offense.”55 Some complain the 
reason some students advocate for “trigger warnings” and “safe 
spaces” is that that young people today do not grow up as inde-
pendently as they once did.56 In many places around the coun-
try, kids are no longer allowed to play outside unsupervised as 
fears of abduction run rampant. Sheltered by their “helicopter 
parents,” some lament, college students today are still closely 
connected to their families, perhaps in part due to technological 
developments like cellphones, social media, and e-mail.57 As a 
result, the argument runs, college has become a time of an “ex-
tended period of adolescence” rather than a time when students 
transition to full adulthood.58 Under this theory, higher educa-
tion students still want their parents, teachers, and adminis-
trators to set rules about what is permitted—and not permit-
ted—in civil discourse. 
It is also possible that university administrators are simply 
increasingly less tolerant of offensive speech. This may be the 
result of “liberal intolerance” of conservative ideas.59 Propor-
tionately few professors are conservative; some studies suggest 
that conservatives find it harder to get academic positions and 
are stigmatized if they do manage to get hired.60 As one com-
mentator provocatively quipped, “We’re fine with people who 
don’t look like us, as long as they think like us.”61  
 
 54. Allison Stanger, Understanding the Angry Mob at Middlebury that 
Gave Me a Concussion, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/03/13/opinion/understanding-the-angry-mob-that-gave-me-a-concussion 
.html. 
 55. Id. at 4. 
 56. See, e.g., Greg Lukianoff & Jonathan Haidt, The Coddling of the Amer-
ican Mind, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ 
archive/2015/09/the-coddling-of-the-american-mind/399356. 
 57. Id. 
 58. A. Douglas Stone & Mary Schwab-Stone, The Sheltering Campus: Why 
College Is Not Home, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
02/07/education/edlife/adolescent-development-college-students.html. 
 59. Nicholas Kristof, A Confession of Liberal Intolerance, N.Y. TIMES (May 
7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/opinions/sunday/a-confession-of 
-liberal-intolerance.html. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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Intolerance for offensive speech may also stem from a de-
sire to please demanding students.62 Universities may worry 
that offensive speech on their campuses will impact the univer-
sity “brand” and turn away prospective students, who are look-
ing for a more nurturing environment.63 New York Times col-
umnist Frank Bruni has identified a worrying trend in higher 
education where students “have come to act as customers—the 
ones who set the terms, the ones who are always right—and 
the degree to which they are treated that way.”64 Universities 
that refuse to censor offensive speech risk being labeled insen-
sitive or even racist.65 One commentator to an op-ed defending 
the expelled University of Oklahoma students said: 
If the behavior of those students is unchecked, then that behavior is 
representative of and reflects upon the University and its culture on 
several levels. 
 Naturally, no institution or organization, private or public, wants 
to be seen as condoning or approving in any way such racist (or sexist 
or any other) behavior.66 
In the age of social media, it is easier for offensive speech to go 
viral, “infect” the university environment, and tarnish the uni-
 
 62. There are notable exceptions to this; one example is the 2016 Univer-
sity of Chicago letter to first-year students. Richard Pérez-Peña, Mitch Smith, 
& Stephanie Saul, University of Chicago Strikes Back Against Campus Politi-
cal Correctness, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/ 
27/us/university-of-chicago-strikes-back-against-campus-political-correctness 
.html. 
 63. See PEN AM. REPORT, supra note 4, at 43 (noting another important 
trend is “viewing students as paying consumers who must be satisfied by their 
experience on campus, lest they vote with their checkbooks by transferring to 
a new institution, or use their influence on social media and elsewhere to tar-
nish the university’s reputation”). 
 64. Frank Bruni, In College Turmoil, Signs of a Changed Relationship 
with Students, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/ 
23/education/in-college-turmoil-signs-of-a-changed-relationship-with-students 
.html. Bruni has been one of the most outspoken critics of the “striking trans-
formation” in the last twenty-five years of the money schools are willing to 
spend to provide their students with amenities like spruced up dormitories, 
more luxurious dining halls, better equipped gymnasiums, and state-of-the-art 
swimming pools, putting greens, arcades, theaters, and even water parks. Id. 
 65. See S. Cagle Juhan, Free Speech, Hate Speech, and the Hostile Speech 
Environment, 98 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1592–93 (2012) (noting that “powerful stu-
dent interest groups . . . lobby administrators, who, in turn, face substantial 
pressure to avoid appearing insufficiently attentive to certain constituencies, 
as well as to diversity and tolerance norms”). 
 66. AstraiaOrianthia, Comment to Oklahoma Students’ Racist Song Is 
Protected Speech: Editorial, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www 
.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2015/03/oklahoma_students_hateful_sing 
.html. 
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versity’s reputation. Universities are less concerned about the 
backlash they might face from over-zealously censoring offen-
sive speech because students face tremendous pressure not to 
engage in such speech at all, and those who do often accept 
their punishments without legal challenge.67 
Students and administrators also appear more willing to 
credit emotional harm as a reason to silence speakers. Indeed, 
this same trend can be seen in some recent First Amendment 
scholarship debating whether the Court’s jurisprudence fails to 
account for the real “harm”—as in emotional harm—some of-
fensive speech can cause.68 As Greg Lukianoff of the Founda-
tion for Individual Rights in Education has argued, it seems to 
be “generally considered unacceptable to question the reasona-
bleness . . . of someone’s emotional state, particularly if those 
emotions are linked to one’s group identity.”69 Students are ad-
mirably passionate about the issues of the day, like the Black 
Lives Matter movement, which largely center around equality. 
Many activists want to eradicate not just discrimination but an 
entire environment that makes discrimination possible.70 As 
one public intellectual has pointed out, these activists “want to 
police social norms so that hurtful comments are no longer tol-
erated and so that real bigotry is given no tacit support.”71 Un-
der this approach, discussions about difficult topics are not tol-
erated even when they are simply “bringing unacceptable 
words [or ideas] into the public square.”72 Relatedly, another 
possible explanation for the heated debate on college campuses 
 
 67. Juhan, supra note 65, at 1593 (“There are also strong disincentives for 
students to advocate for, much less litigate, their free speech rights in the face 
of university hostility.”). 
 68. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 
SUP. CT. REV. 81. 
 69. Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 56. 
 70. See David Brooks, The Campus Crusaders, N.Y. TIMES (June. 2, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/02/opinion/david-brooks-the-campus 
-crusaders.html. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. Brooks refers to incidents where students attacked speakers who 
mentioned offensive words only to condemn them. For example, Wendy 
Kaminer was attacked when she used the “n” word during an event at Smith 
College, and a Brandeis professor suffered the same fate for mentioning a His-
panic slur, even though he did so in the context of condemning it. Id. Related-
ly, Laura Kipnis at Northwestern was accused of creating a hostile environ-
ment when she wrote an article questioning sexual mores on college campuses. 
Id. Judith Shulevitz explored these and other similar examples in her well-
known New York Times essay. Judith Shulevitz, In College and Hiding from 
Scary Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2015, at SR1. 
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is that the national dialogue as a whole is more polarized, 
which leads to greater “demonization” of the other side.73 
In considering what might have changed in the last few 
decades, it is worth considering the possibility that public uni-
versity administrators believe that developments in First 
Amendment jurisprudence give them greater power to restrict 
offensive speech on their campuses. Even though the Court has 
continued to reaffirm that the First Amendment requires the 
toleration of offensive speech,74 the Court has watered down the 
First Amendment protections in various government institu-
tions, including the workplace75 and schools.76 In these contexts, 
the Court has generally been convinced that the proper func-
tioning of these institutions demands some flexibility in the 
usual First Amendment rules. Critics of the Court’s controver-
sial decisions in cases like R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul would ide-
ally like the Court to revisit its protection of hate speech, but in 
the meantime, they can argue that the rule of this case should 
not apply in certain institutional settings, like public schools 
and government workplaces. Furthermore, while the Court has 
not directly held that universities are entitled to a measure of 
deference when they restrict student speech on campus, in re-
cent years the Court has expressly embraced deference in the 
affirmative action and freedom of association contexts.77 Part 
III will discuss these cases in greater detail.78 
II.  APPLICATION OF STANDARD FIRST AMENDMENT 
DOCTRINE   
Because the scope of statutory liability under federal anti-
discrimination law is not as broad as many believe, in at least 
some situations public colleges and universities choose to re-
strict student speech not because they legally are required to do 
so, but because they want to do so. Then the question is wheth-
 
 73. Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 56. 
 74. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); United States v. Ste-
vens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 75. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 76. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 77. See cases infra Part III.A.2. 
 78. This may be giving professors and administrators in higher education 
too much credit. I suspect that in many instances, the punishment comes first 
and the legal arguments come later, if and when litigation is threatened. 
Based on my personal observations, most professors, including law school pro-
fessors, do not have a good grasp of the law governing student speech rights 
unless they have sought guidance from university counsel. 
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er the First Amendment gives them this power, and under 
what circumstances. This Part will begin by examining what 
the Supreme Court has said about the constitutionality of anti-
discrimination laws when used to restrict speech. Next, the 
Part explains how standard First Amendment doctrine pro-
vides very limited protection for university attempts to restrict 
or punish speech that is believed to create—or at least pose the 
risk of creating—a hostile or discriminatory environment. 
A. THE SUPREME COURT’S MISSING ANALYSIS 
Remarkably, it remains an open question whether punish-
ing offensive speech that creates a hostile learning environ-
ment is constitutional under the First Amendment. Surprising-
ly, the Supreme Court has never directly held that anti-
discrimination laws are consistent with the First Amendment, 
although it has repeatedly suggested in dicta that they are. De-
spite the paucity of Supreme Court precedent directly address-
ing this difficult issue, some commentators have proclaimed 
that the constitutionality of hostile environment claims is not 
up for debate.79 What is not clear, however, is the rationale for 
this understanding. In light of this gap in the Court’s jurispru-
dence, it remains unclear how to reconcile the Court’s decisions 
striking down viewpoint-based laws with its repeated sugges-
tions that anti-harassment laws do not violate the First 
Amendment. The Court’s recent decision in Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert,80 which declared that all content-based laws are subject 
to strict scrutiny, makes this even more confusing. 
In 1986, the Court held in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 
that Title VII prohibited hostile environment sexual harass-
ment.81 The Court made clear, however, that the workplace 
conduct must “affect . . . a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of em-
ployment within the meaning of Title VII.”82 To do so, the Court 
explained, the harassment “must be sufficiently severe or per-
vasive ‘to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and 
create an abusive working environment.’”83 In 1993, in Harris v. 
 
 79. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against 
Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 958–59 (2009) (stating that 
“[d]espite these arguments, the illegality of speech that contributes to a hostile 
work environment is a fait accompli,” given what the Court has said in dicta). 
 80. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
 81. 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986). 
 82. Id. at 64–66. 
 83. Id. at 67. 
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Forklift Systems, Inc., the Court clarified that plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that a “reasonable person” would find the work 
environment objectively hostile or abusive and that the plaintiff 
herself perceived the work environment to be hostile or abu-
sive.84 
In between Meritor and Harris, the Court decided R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul. In that case, the Court struck down a local or-
dinance banning fighting words motivated by race, color, creed, 
religion, or gender.85 In dicta, the Court noted that Title VII 
was different because it banned only “conduct,” not speech, but 
the Court offered no analysis to support this conclusion.86 
R.A.V. itself does not help explain the constitutionality of hos-
tile environment laws because these laws do not target a subset 
of otherwise constitutionally proscribable speech as “the worst 
of the worst.” Of course some hate speech might be labeled the 
“worst of the worst”; for example, as discussed in greater detail 
below, the Court has held that a burning cross directed at a 
specific individual with the intent to intimidate is not entitled 
to constitutional protection.87 But much of the offensive speech 
subject to punishment on college campuses would not fall with-
in this category. The next part examines some other possible 
justifications for carving out offensive speech from the protec-
tions of the First Amendment. 
B. USING STANDARD FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE TO 
RESTRICT OFFENSIVE STUDENT SPEECH 
Various scholars have embraced a wide variety of First 
Amendment doctrines to support the constitutionality of anti-
harassment statutes in the workplace and in the education con-
text: (1) is not speech at all and therefore falls outside of the 
First Amendment; (2) employees and students are “captive au-
diences”; (3) harassment laws are permissible time, place, and 
manner restrictions; and (4) the “secondary effects” doctrine 
applies. None of these doctrines works particularly well, or at 
 
 84. 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
 85. 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992). 
 86. Id. at 389. Not all members of the Court agreed with this statement. 
In dissent, Justice White argued that Title VII was also unconstitutional be-
cause “it ‘imposes special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on 
disfavored subjects.’ Under the broad principle the Court uses to decide the 
present case, hostile work environment claims based on sexual harassment 
should fail First Amendment review.” Id. at 409–10 (White, J., dissenting). 
 87. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (holding that 
cross burning with the intent to intimidate is not protected speech). 
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the very least, none of them can provide a full explanation for 
the constitutionality of these laws, or how the schools apply 
them. 
It is really troubling to declare that all speech that con-
tributes to a hostile environment is not speech at all. In Holder 
v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Court declared that even 
laws that are aimed at “conduct” are subject to strict scrutiny if 
“as applied . . . the conduct triggering coverage under the stat-
ute consists of communicating a message.”88 Indeed, the reason 
schools want to punish students who engage in offensive speech 
is precisely because the schools believe the message of that 
speech is antithetical to the values and mission of the institu-
tion.89 Declaring that speech that creates a hostile environment 
is not “speech” under the First Amendment is particularly 
troubling given expanding conceptions of what kind of expres-
sive activities are problematic. In addition, the trend in courts 
around the country is expanding First Amendment coverage, 
not reducing it. The real struggle right now is figuring out 
whether our traditional framework for dealing with free speech 
questions makes sense given this expanding scope of the First 
Amendment. 
“Harassment” is not a category of unprotected or lesser-
protected speech; neither is “offensive” speech.90 Indeed, it is 
regarded as a “bedrock principle” that the First Amendment 
protects offensive speech.91 That said, some harassing or offen-
sive student speech will fall within a category of unprotected or 
lesser-protected speech. The most likely categories are fighting 
words, true threats, incitement, and defamation. The question 
in any case will be whether the expression at issue satisfies all 
of the requirements for these categories of speech. These cate-
 
 88. 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010). 
 89. Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 
F.2d 386, 392 (4th Cir. 1993) (involving a university that punished students 
for “ugly woman contest” precisely because of its message). 
 90. Some scholars have suggested that the First Amendment never toler-
ates the restriction of speech that creates a hostile educational environment. 
See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, University of Oklahoma Expels the First 
Amendment, JURIST TWENTY (Mar. 14, 2015), http://jurist.org/forum/2015/03/ 
howard-wasserman-first-amendment.php (“The need to avoid a hostile envi-
ronment is not recognized as a basis for limiting otherwise-protected, even if 
hateful, expression.”). 
 91. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bed-
rock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may 
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea it-
self offensive or disagreeable.”). 
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gories are very carefully defined and will come into play in very 
few circumstances. 
1. Fighting Words 
Some harassing speech might properly fall within the cate-
gory of fighting words, but this approach is problematic for a 
number of reasons. The first is that it is not entirely clear this 
category of speech even exists anymore because the Court has 
not invoked “fighting words” to uphold a speech restriction 
since Chaplinsky.92 The Court rejected fighting words claims in 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul93 and Snyder v. Phelps.94 
Even if this category of speech exists, it is unclear exactly 
what it is. Historically, the Court has suggested this category 
has two possible definitions: (1) offensive or abusive language 
that by its very utterance inflicts injury; or (2) language that by 
its very nature, judged by the probable reaction of a person of 
common intelligence, is likely to produce a violent reaction.95 It 
is not clear that the first type of fighting words is consistent 
with modern First Amendment jurisprudence. The Court has 
indicated that the First Amendment requires people to tolerate 
insulting, outrageous, and offensive speech.96 
The second type of fighting words is not much more prom-
ising. It is hardly clear why speech should lose protection 
whenever it arouses an audience to anger. People often get an-
gry when they hear speech they do not like. In addition, as one 
scholar has noted, the concern with hostile environment har-
assment is not that victims will engage in violence in response 
to the speech, but rather they will not speak at all.97 Another 
obstacle is that for speech to constitute fighting words, it has to 
be directed to a specific individual.98 Some speech certainly 
 
 92. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 93. 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992). 
 94. 562 U.S. 443, 451 n.3 (2011). 
 95. See id. at 465; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). 
 96. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 18–19. This result might 
be different if there were a captive audience; this possibility will be discussed 
in a moment. 
 97. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches 
to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 421 (“The problem is that she is 
not going to fight back—that she will be intimidated and silenced by their 
heckling.”). 
 98. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 (holding that a “Fuck the Draft” jacket did 
not constitute fighting words because speech was not specifically directed to a 
particular individual). 
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meets this requirement, but so much speech does not. For ex-
ample, the video of the fraternity members singing a racist 
song was not directed to a particular individual.99 Furthermore, 
the very doctrine of fighting words is inconsistent with the uni-
versity setting. As one lower court has said, “Communications 
which provoke a response, especially in the university setting, 
have historically been deemed an objective to be sought after 
rather than a detriment to be avoided.”100 
2. Incitement 
Colleges and universities are on firmer footing if the offen-
sive student speech constitutes incitement, but in most cases, 
the speech will not be able to meet all of the requirements of 
this category of unprotected expression.  
Current First Amendment doctrine permits the punish-
ment of speech that incites unlawful conduct, but the speaker 
must have subjectively intended to incite that unlawful conduct 
and directly advocated the unlawful action, and the unlawful 
action must be “imminent.”101 Most speech fails to meet this 
standard; the imminence requirement alone will be fatal in 
most cases, particularly those cases that involve digital expres-
sion where there will almost always be a significant time delay 
between the speech and action. 
3. True Threats 
Although the category of “true threats” will encompass 
some speech that makes students feel unsafe, this category, too, 
has particular requirements that will pose obstacles in some 
cases. 
The Court has held that the “true threats” doctrine “en-
compass those statements where the speaker means to com-
municate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of 
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individ-
uals.”102 An individual need not intend to carry out the threat; 
the purpose of the true threats doctrine is to protect people 
from the fear of violence and the disruption in their lives that 
 
 99. See supra notes 1–3. 
 100. Bair v. Shippensburg Univ., 280 F. Supp. 2d 357, 370–71 (M.D. Pa. 
2003). 
 101. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
 102. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
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fear can cause.103 It is important to keep in mind, however, that 
the Court has recognized that some speech containing threat-
ening language may be fully protected speech. 
For example, in Watts v. United States, the Court struck 
down a conviction for threatening the President because the al-
legedly threatening statement was “political hyperbole.”104 In 
that case, the defendant was taking part in a public rally 
against police brutality and stated, “[i]f they ever make me car-
ry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J. They 
are not going to make me kill my black brothers.”105 In throwing 
out the conviction, the Court cited its famous assertion in New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan that “debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well in-
clude vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp at-
tacks on government and public officials.”106 The Court held 
that the context of Watts’s statement, as well as “the expressly 
conditional nature of the statement and the reaction of the lis-
teners,” made it clear that the government could not show that 
the defendant had made a true threat.107 Similarly, in Virginia 
v. Black, the Court made clear that not all cross burning is nec-
essarily done with the necessary intent to intimidate and that a 
contextual inquiry is essential in each case to determine 
whether that intent is present.108 
It remains an open issue whether the speaker must subjec-
tively intend to place an individual in fear of violence in order 
for his speech to constitute a true threat. In Elonis v. United 
States, the Court failed to answer the question of whether the 
First Amendment also requires a speaker to have intended to 
 
 103. Id. at 360. 
 104. 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam). 
 105. Id. at 706. 
 106. Id. at 708 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 
(1964)). 
 107. Id. 
 108. 538 U.S. 343, 365–66 (2003) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (“As the 
history of cross burning indicates, a burning cross is not always intended to 
intimidate.”). Justice Souter, joined by two other Justices, also recognized that 
cross burning is not always done with the intent to intimidate but would have 
struck down the statute as unconstitutional, rather than sever the “prima fa-
cie” evidence clause of the statute, as the plurality suggested was possible. Id. 
at 380–81 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“As the ma-
jority points out, the burning cross can broadcast threat and ideology together, 
ideology alone, or threat alone . . . .”); id. at 367 (O’Connor, J., plurality opin-
ion) (“We also leave open the possibility that the provision is severable . . . .”). 
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place the subject of the threat in fear for his or her safety.109 
The Court instead held that although the federal threats stat-
ute at issue in that case110 did not contain a scienter require-
ment,111 general requirements of federal criminal law require 
that the government prove more than simply that the defend-
ant acted negligently.112 This case provides little insight into 
what sort of intent standard would be required if a school relied 
on the true threats doctrine to expel or suspend students; ad-
ministrative punishments are not criminal in nature. 
At the very least, the student’s fear would have to be “ob-
jectively reasonable.”113 The Oklahoma fraternity song would 
not satisfy this standard, even if sometimes students might 
claim they feel “unsafe” on campus.114 The song was not di-
rected at any particular individual, and in fact the speech came 
to light only after the video someone took of the bus ride was 
posted online.115 
4. Defamation 
False, defamatory, and unprivileged speech is actionable 
under the common law116 and considered lesser-protected 
speech under the First Amendment.117 Some offensive speech on 
college campuses might be actionable defamation, and school 
officials would be free to punish such speech without any con-
stitutional concerns. 
That said, the tort of defamation is subject to several im-
portant limitations that will limit the usefulness of this catego-
ry of speech. For example, the First Amendment fully protects 
hyperbolic speech118 as well as any other statements that can-
 
 109. 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012–13 (2015). 
 110. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). 
 111. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2008–09. 
 112. Id. at 2011–12. 
 113. See Fernandez & Eckholm, supra note 2 (stating that the legal schol-
ars they interviewed believed that the racist chant could be legally punished if 
it led “a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety”). 
 114. See id. (stating that Oklahoma University students interviewed sup-
ported the decision to expel the chanters, based on the reference to lynching 
and the fact that it might make students feel unsafe). 
 115. Id. 
 116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 117. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that 
a public official must prove that a defamatory statement was made with actual 
malice). 
 118. See, e.g., Greenbelt Co-op Pub. Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (the 
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not be proven true or false.119 In addition, individuals seeking to 
restrict student speech on the grounds that it is defamatory 
must overcome the tort’s “of and concerning” requirement—the 
challenged statement must be about the plaintiff.120 In Beau-
harnais v. Illinois, the Court upheld a criminal libel statute 
punishing speech that “portray[ed] depravity, criminality, 
unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, 
color, creed or religion,”121 but it is unlikely that this case is still 
good law.122 It was decided before the Court recognized in New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan that defamation was not entirely 
outside the protections of the First Amendment,123 and group 
libel seems inconsistent with R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, which 
held that laws singling out fighting words targeting certain ra-
cial or other minority groups is unconstitutional.124 
The biggest obstacle for defamation claims will typically be 
a failure to satisfy the requirement that the speech be “of and 
concerning” a particular student or small group of students.125 
Speech that tends to lower the reputation of all students be-
longing to a particular group will not satisfy this standard. For 
example, the “Asians in the Library” video would not be action-
able defamation because the speaker referred to all Asians and 
not to any one person in particular.126 
5. The Captive Audience Doctrine 
It is possible that universities could look to the “captive 
audience” doctrine to justify the restriction of student speech in 
some limited circumstances.127 Scholars disagree on whether 
 
First Amendment fully protects rhetorical hyperbole). 
 119. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1990). 
 120. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 267 (“The jury must find that the words 
were published ‘of and concerning’ the plaintiff . . . .”). 
 121. 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952). 
 122. See, e.g., Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. #204, 523 F.3d 668, 672 
(7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]hough Beauharnais . . . has never been overruled, no one 
thinks the First Amendment would today be interpreted to allow group defa-
mation to be prohibited.” (citation omitted)). 
 123. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 268 (explaining that the argument that the Con-
stitution did not protect “libelous” publications did not end the inquiry). 
 124. 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992). 
 125. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 126. See supra note 20. 
 127. See, e.g., Jack M. Battaglia, Regulation of Hate Speech by Educational 
Institutions: A Proposed Policy, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 345, 376 (1991) (ex-
plaining that a hate speech policy “may express greater concern with speech 
which occurs in a dormitory or classroom, or where there otherwise is a ‘cap-
  
1824 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1801 
 
the captive audience doctrine can be used to justify hostile en-
vironment harassment laws.128 It is entirely unclear under what 
circumstances the Court would be willing to embrace the doc-
trine because the cases have dealt with such varying factual 
scenarios.129 The Court has not always embraced the captive 
audience doctrine,130 and defining this doctrine is a study in 
frustration. It is not clear whether and how it would apply, if at 
all, on university campuses. 
The Court has embraced the doctrine in the context of 
broadcast television,131 public transportation,132 and unsolicited 
mail,133 but rejected it in the context of a school board meeting134 
and in a courthouse.135 As J.M. Balkin has noted, “There is 
simply no bright line test to tell us whether a situation of 
speech involves coercion or not.”136 The Court has frequently 
stated that confronting offensive speech is part of daily life.137 
 
tive audience,’ than with speech which occurs at scheduled rallies and public 
addresses”). 
 128. For different views on the applicability of the captive audience doc-
trine to the workplace, see Balkin, supra note 97, at 423 (arguing that the av-
erage worker is a captive audience); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harass-
ment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog that Didn’t Bark, 
1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 18–19 (noting the lack of clarity regarding when an au-
dience is “captive” because the doctrine is “inchoate” and seems to depend 
more on “the character of the place” than “the degree of audience captivity”); 
Volokh, supra note 39, at 314–15 (arguing that the Supreme Court should not 
find that employees in the workplace are “captive”). 
 129. See infra notes 131–35 and accompanying text. 
 130. See infra notes 134–35 and accompanying text. 
 131. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 
(1978). 
 132. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 305–08 (1974) (Doug-
las, J., concurring) (agreeing with majority that city could ban political ads on 
public transportation to protect captive audience). 
 133. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 735–38 (1970). 
 134. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972). 
 135. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21–22 (1971). 
 136. Balkin, supra note 97, at 415; see also Marcy Strauss, Redefining the 
Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 85 (1991). 
 137. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (speech on mat-
ters of public concern “cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or 
arouses contempt”); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–11 
(1975) (“Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit government to decide 
which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require 
protection for the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather, . . . the burden normal-
ly falls upon the viewer to ‘avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities 
simply by averting [his] eyes.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 
21)); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (“[W]e have . . . consistently stressed that ‘we are 
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Those who do not wish to hear offensive speech can “avert their 
eyes”—or ears—and engage in counterspeech if they do not like 
what they hear.138 
Applying the captive audience doctrine to the university 
setting is particularly problematic. Most fundamentally, uni-
versities are a place, like the public square, where students are 
supposed to confront ideas with which they disagree, some-
times vehemently.139 Allowing universities to silence speakers 
who engage in speech other people find “offensive” seems par-
ticularly incongruous with the university setting. 
Furthermore, even if the captive audience doctrine had 
some application to university students, its relevance would 
depend on the particular context in which the doctrine is as-
serted.140 The strongest settings for the application of the cap-
tive audience doctrine would be in dormitories and maybe in 
classrooms.141 
The difficulty of applying the captive audience doctrine in 
the dormitories, however, is that both speakers and audiences 
call that place “home.”142 Students who cannot easily escape of-
fensive speech in their dormitory common areas, bathrooms, or 
rooms might argue that they should not have to tolerate such 
speech when they are “home,” but likewise speakers might just 
as readily contend that their speech rights should not be so 
readily restricted when they are also speaking at home.143 In 
addition, one of the benefits of residential life in the university 
setting is to expose students to the different lifestyles, back-
 
often “captives” outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable 
speech.’” (quoting Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738)). 
 138. See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (suggesting that those in the court-
room look away). 
 139. See Balkin, supra note 97, at 424 n.103 (explaining that a university 
may have an interest in “enforced toleration of the intolerant”). 
 140. See id. (stating that students’ interest in being free from coercion 
would be different in different contexts). 
 141. Battaglia, supra note 127 (explaining that a hate speech policy “may 
express greater concern with speech which occurs in a dormitory or classroom, 
or where there otherwise is a ‘captive audience,’ than with speech which oc-
curs at scheduled rallies and public addresses”). 
 142. See HOUS. & FOOD SERVS., LIVING ON CAMPUS AT THE CENTER OF IT 
ALL 2, https://ou.edu/content/dam/HousingFood/Documents/Users-Aaron 
-Desktop-Forms-Exemption.pdf (“Most of the highest ranked universities in 
the nation require virtually 100% of their freshmen to live on campus.”). 
 143. See Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 735–38 (1969) (“The 
ancient concept that ‘a man’s home is his castle’ into which ‘not even the king 
may enter’ has lost none of its vitality . . . .”). 
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grounds, and beliefs of their classmates.144 Allowing students to 
silence their classmates whenever they are offended would un-
dermine this important benefit of residential life. 
A captive audience argument in classrooms is even more 
difficult because we expect students to tolerate speech they do 
not like or might even find offensive when made in the context 
of a class discussion. It might be possible to extend the doctrine 
to extracurricular activities, although in many instances partic-
ipating in such activities is not as “essential” and unavoidable 
as attending class and living in a dormitory is.145 
Even if the captive audience doctrine applies in classes and 
dormitories, however, it would not apply to many other settings 
where public universities and colleges restrict expression. The 
captive audience rational would not apply to optional lectures 
and speakers on campus.146 It would not apply to speakers in 
areas around campus that resemble streets, parks, and side-
walks.147 And it is very hard to see how the captive audience 
doctrine would apply to most social media platforms, unless 
students are required to use social media as part of their clas-
ses. For example, it does not appear that any University of Ok-
lahoma student was in any way forced or coerced to watch the 
racist SAE video discussed in the introduction of this Article,148 
or any UCLA student the YouTube video “Asians in the Li-
brary.”149 
6. Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 
Universities may constitutionally take advantage of time, 
place, and manner restrictions to limit some speech. The Court 
has made clear that even in quintessential public fora, the gov-
ernment has the power to impose content neutral speech re-
 
 144. See HOUS. & FOOD SERVS., supra note 142, at 3 (stating that living on 
campus will lead to being able to “meet more people of diverse backgrounds 
from different parts of the world”). 
 145. J.M. Balkin has conceded that the captive audience doctrine might 
carry more weight in certain parts of the university than others. Balkin, supra 
note 97, at 424 n.103 (suggesting the captive audience doctrine might have 
application in the classroom and the dormitory). 
 146. See Battaglia, supra note 127 (stating that “scheduled rallies and pub-
lic addresses” would be of less concern for school policies). 
 147. See Balkin, supra note 97, at 424 n.103 (explaining that speech in 
dormitories would be treated differently from “arguments in the public streets 
outside the campus”). 
 148. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text. 
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strictions that serve significant government interests.150 The 
important limitation on the utility of time, place, and manner 
restrictions, however, is that they be content-neutral and ap-
plied even-handedly.151 As a result, time, place, and manner re-
strictions are not particularly useful in most situations where 
the college or university wants to punish or restrict speech spe-
cifically because of its offensive content. 
7. Secondary Effects Doctrine 
The secondary effects doctrine is of even more limited as-
sistance to universities. This doctrine has developed in the con-
text of adult entertainment, where the Court has indulged the 
fiction that zoning laws aimed at establishments that offer such 
entertainment are not impermissibly content-based because 
they are aimed at the “secondary effects” of that speech on 
crime rates and property values.152 This reasoning seems ques-
tionable at best, but in any event, the Court has showed no 
willingness to extend this doctrine beyond the context of adult 
entertainment. Any attempts to apply the secondary effects 
doctrine to offensive speech in the university setting should fail 
because it is obvious that the regulation of such expression is 
aimed directly at the communicative value of the speech and its 
impact on the audience. 
All in all, traditional First Amendment doctrine—even 
without taking into account the Court’s cases involving the ed-
ucational context in particular—give schools some ability to re-
strict or punish students’ expression activities. But it certainly 
does not give them all of the power they might want. 
 
 150. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 
85, 93 (1977) (“[L]aws regulating the time, place, or manner of speech stand on 
a different footing from laws prohibiting speech altogether.”). 
 151. See, e.g., id. at 93–94 (finding that the ordinance in question was not 
content-neutral, and therefore not could not be sustained). 
 152. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 433–42 
(2002) (giving deference to city to engage in zoning to address the secondary 
effects of multi-use adult establishments); City of Renton v. Playtime Thea-
tres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (holding that zoning of adult establishments 
was content-neutral under secondary effects doctrine because “[t]he ordinance 
by its terms is designed to prevent crime, protect the city’s retail trade, main-
tain property values, and generally ‘protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the 
city’s] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life,’ not 
to suppress the expression of unpopular views”). 
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III.  THE SUPREME COURT AND STUDENTS   
The Supreme Court has decided several cases in the higher 
education setting involving the speech rights of students. These 
decisions leave open some important questions about the scope 
of a public university’s authority to restrict or punish the 
speech of its students. In recent years, some lower courts have 
used the courts’ decisions relating to K–12 public education to 
provide this missing guidance. In addition, some lower courts 
have looked to the doctrinal approach that has evolved in the 
context of public employment and have increasingly recognized 
the right to punish students for speech that does not satisfy 
“professional” standards. 
Relying on decisions in the K–12 and workplace contexts is 
deeply troubling in light of the fundamental differences be-
tween universities, workplaces, and K–12 schools. The increas-
ing use of professionalism standards is likewise dangerous be-
cause such standards are often vague and their application is 
subject to the significant discretion of university administra-
tors. 
A. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT IN THE HIGHER EDUCATION 
CONTEXT 
The Supreme Court’s cases involving the free speech rights 
of university students suggest that they enjoy robust protec-
tion.153 These cases generally contain very speech-protective 
language, and the Court has time and time again singled out 
the university as a special institution in the marketplace of 
ideas. Simultaneously, however, the Court has indicated that it 
is also appropriate to defer to university administrators. This 
tension sends mixed messages and provides little guidance 
when trying to determine what sort of limits the First Amend-
 
 153. It is unclear whether students can stake a claim to academic freedom, 
particularly when that claim conflicts with the university’s own claim to aca-
demic freedom. Some of the Court’s precedents suggest that students enjoy 
some measure of academic freedom themselves. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of 
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“Our Nation is deeply committed to safe-
guarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not 
merely to the teachers concerned.”). But many scholars have argued that the 
rights students enjoy rest solidly on the First Amendment and not the doctrine 
of academic freedom. See, e.g., Scott R. Bauries, Individual Academic Freedom: 
An Ordinary Concern of the First Amendment, 83 MISS. L.J. 677, 679 (2014) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court has never recognized academic freedom as a unique or 
‘special’ individual right under the First Amendment that inheres only in aca-
demics.”). 
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ment might place on public universities’ restrictions of student 
speech. 
1. Student Speech Cases 
In a number of cases, the Court has suggested that univer-
sity students have robust speech rights. In Healy v. James, for 
example, the Court held that a college could not deny recogni-
tion to a student group on the grounds that it thought the 
group’s philosophy was “antithetical to the school’s policies.”154 
The overall thrust of the opinion is that the speech rights of 
university students are nearly co-extensive with adults in soci-
ety at large. Specifically, the Court stated: 
The precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because 
of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections 
should apply with less force on college campuses than in the commu-
nity at large. Quite to the contrary, “[t]he vigilant protection of consti-
tutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of 
American schools.” The college classroom with its surrounding envi-
rons is peculiarly the “marketplace of ideas,” and we break no new 
constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to safe-
guarding academic freedom.155 
Healy left open the possibility that the college could deny 
recognition to a student group that posed a likelihood of disrup-
tion or failed to follow reasonable time, place, and manner 
rules.156 The Court made clear that a university would face a 
“heavy burden” to justify a restraint on associational activi-
ties.157 The Court gave short shrift to the college’s argument 
that it should not be forced to give its “administrative seal of 
official college respectability.”158 The Court held that non-
recognition was an “impermissible, albeit indirect, infringe-
ment” of the students’ associational rights.159 
A year after Healy, the Court once again ruled in favor of a 
student, holding that a public university could not expel a stu-
dent for distributing on campus a newspaper with “indecent” 
content on a day prospective students were visiting with their 
 
 154. 408 U.S. 169, 175 (1972). 
 155. Id. at 180–81 (citations omitted) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 
479, 487 (1960)). 
 156. Id. at 192–93. 
 157. Id. at 184. 
 158. Id. at 182 (quoting Healy v. James, 319 F. Supp. 113, 116 (D. Conn. 
1970)). 
 159. Id. at 183. 
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parents.160 In Papish v. Board of Curators, the Court relied on 
Healy to hold that a school could not punish a student for “the 
mere dissemination of ideas” that were “offensive to good taste” 
when the speech could not be “labeled as constitutionally ob-
scene or otherwise unprotected.”161 The Court also rejected the 
school’s argument that its actions were the result of a valid 
time, place, and manner restriction because it was clear the 
student was expelled “because of the disapproved content of the 
newspaper rather than the time, place, or manner of its distri-
bution.”162 In a footnote, the Court also noted that the universi-
ty had failed to assert that the newspaper disrupted the opera-
tion of the school.163 In dissent, Justice Rehnquist criticized the 
Court’s “wooden insistence on equating, for constitutional pur-
poses, the authority of the State to criminally punish with its 
authority to exercise even a modicum of control over the uni-
versity which it operates.”164 
Until recently, the Court has held firmly that universities 
cannot treat students and student groups differently based on 
their viewpoints. In Widmar v. Vincent, the Court held a state 
university could not exclude religious groups from using the 
university’s facilities otherwise open for registered student 
groups.165 The Court rejected the university’s arguments that 
the exclusion was consistent with its mission to provide a “secu-
lar” education and held that the usual First Amendment rules 
applied in the university setting.166 Importantly, the Court ex-
plained that “an open forum in a public university does not con-
 
 160. Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 667–70, 668 n.3 (1973). 
 161. Id. at 670. The newspaper contained a political cartoon “depicting po-
licemen raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice”; the paper 
also contained an article entitled “M-----f----- Acquitted.” Id. at 667. 
 162. Id. at 670. 
 163. Id. at 670 n.6 (“[I]n the absence of any disruption of campus order or 
interference with the rights of others, the sole issue was whether a state uni-
versity could proscribe this form of expression.”). The Court does not cite Tink-
er here, but this language is clearly coming from that case. Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (“[T]he record does not 
demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to 
forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activi-
ties . . . .”). 
 164. Papish, 410 U.S. at 677 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissenters al-
so believed that the student’s use of profanity was not protected expression. 
Id. at 676. 
 165. 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981). 
 166. Id. at 267 (holding that once the university had created an open fo-
rum, it had “assumed an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclu-
sions under applicable constitutional norms” (footnote omitted)). 
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fer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or prac-
tices,”167 and that because university students are adults, 
“[t]hey are less impressionable than younger students and 
should be able to appreciate that the University’s policy is one 
of neutrality toward religion.”168 
Similarly, in both Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the 
University of Virginia and Board of Regents v. Southworth, the 
Court held that mandatory student activity fees are constitu-
tional only if viewpoint-neutral criteria are used to distribute 
them.169 In both Rosenberger and Southworth, the Court agreed 
with the general principle that a university “must have sub-
stantial discretion in determining how to allocate scarce re-
sources to accomplish its educational mission,”170 but it can en-
gage in viewpoint discrimination only if it is the university’s 
own speech.171 The Court explained in no uncertain terms how 
dangerous the suppression of student speech on the basis of 
viewpoint is in the university setting: “For the University . . . to 
cast disapproval on particular viewpoints of its students risks 
the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the 
vital centers for the Nation’s intellectual life, its college and 
university campuses.”172 
Lurking in the background of Healy, Southworth, Widmar, 
and Rosenberger were suggestions from various Justices that 
traditional First Amendment principles should not control in 
the higher education setting. Indeed, these strict principles 
would clearly not make sense in some contexts. In Widmar, the 
Court went out of its way to make clear that its holding does 
 
 167. Id. at 274. 
 168. Id. at 274 n.14. In her Rosenberger concurrence, Justice O’Connor as-
serted that when a forum has a “wide array” of speech, “any perception that 
the University endorses one particular viewpoint would be illogical.” Rosen-
berger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 850 (1995). 
 169. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233 (2000); Rosenberger, 
515 U.S. at 841. 
 170. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 832. 
 171. Id. at 834 (“A holding that the University may not discriminate based 
on the viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates does not restrict 
the University’s own speech, which is controlled by different principles.”); see 
Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229 (“If the challenged speech here were financed by 
tuition dollars and the University and its officials were responsible for its con-
tent, the case might be evaluated on the premise that the government itself is 
the speaker.”); see also id. at 235 (“Where the University speaks, either in its 
own name or through its regents or officers, or in myriad other ways through 
its diverse faculties, the analysis likely would be altogether different.”). 
 172. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 836. 
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not question “the right of the University to make academic 
judgments as to how to allocate scarce resources or ‘to deter-
mine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may 
be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to 
study.’”173 More specifically, Justice Stevens pointed out in his 
Widmar concurrence that universities have to make content-
based decisions all the time: “They select books for inclusion in 
the library, they hire professors on the basis of their academic 
philosophies, they select courses for inclusion in the curricu-
lum, and they reward scholars for what they have written.”174 
The question becomes how far does this deference extend; does 
it extend so far as to apply whenever a college or university 
contends that a speech restriction is consistent with their mis-
sion? Justice Souter raised this question in his Southworth con-
currence, where he posited that “protecting a university’s dis-
cretion to shape its educational mission may prove to be an 
important consideration in First Amendment analysis of objec-
tions to student fees.”175 
In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,176 the view that the 
Court should defer to a university’s decisions took center stage. 
In that case, a law student group at Hastings Law School chal-
lenged the school’s requirement that any student group seeking 
official recognition and access to school funds and facilities had 
to abide by an “accept-all-comers” nondiscrimination policy.177 
This is a perfect example of a school policy that the law does 
not require—indeed, after Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, ex-
pressive associations are entitled to exclude members who do 
not share their core beliefs178—but Hastings adopted the non-
 
 173. 454 U.S. at 276 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 174. Id. at 278 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also mentions that 
schools offering extracurricular activities have to determine “the content of 
those activities.” Id. 
 175. 529 U.S. at 239 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 
262–64 (Frankfurter, J. concurring)). In that case, the university had not 
made an argument that it was entitled to deference based on its educational 
mission or academic freedom principles. 
 176. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law 
v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010). 
 177. Id. at 668. The policy, as written, was not actually an all-comers policy 
but rather prohibited discrimination based on “race, color, religion, national 
origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation,” but the parties liti-
gated the case in the district court as if it were an all-comers policy. Id. at 670. 
 178. 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000). 
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discrimination policy, it claimed, in order to promote reasona-
ble educational purposes179 and to promote inclusivity.180 
In evaluating the reasonableness of Hastings’ policy, the 
Court expressly stated that “[o]ur inquiry is shaped by the edu-
cational context in which it arises,” given the “special charac-
teristics of the school environment.”181 In addition, the Court 
cautioned against substituting its own judgment for the “on-
the-ground expertise and experience of school administrators”182 
and concluded that Hastings’ policy was entitled to “due decent 
respect” and “appropriate regard.”183 Although the Court ques-
tioned the wisdom of Hastings’ policy,184 it deferred uncritically 
to Hastings’ assertion that the policy promoted the university’s 
goals to encourage “tolerance, cooperation, and learning among 
students” and was consistent with the State’s disdain for dis-
crimination.185 
The dissent complained bitterly that the majority’s defer-
ence to the university was inconsistent with Healy and the 
Court’s other higher education student speech cases.186 Several 
scholars have joined the lament. Richard Epstein complained 
that the high level of deference the Court gave Hastings “had 
the unfortunate consequence of letting Hastings run roughshod 
over a weak and defenseless religious organization under its 
banner of toleration, cooperation, and learning.”187 Another 
scholar noted that the decision “marks a return to an early-
American understanding of student rights” that rested on the 
 
 179. Martinez, 561 U.S. at 668. 
 180. See id. at 694 (“Hastings, caught in the crossfire between a group’s 
desire to exclude and students’ demand for equal access, may reasonably draw 
a line in the sand permitting all organizations to express what they wish but 
no group to discriminate in membership.”). 
 181. Id. at 685–86 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 265, 268 n.5 
(1981)). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 687. 
 184. See, e.g., id. at 701 (Stevens, J. concurring) (“This approach may or 
might not be the wisest choice.”). 
 185. Id. at 689 (quoting Joint Appendix II, Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of 
Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010) (No. 08-
1371), 2010 WL 363298, at *349). It seems odd that a goal of “toleration” re-
quires students groups to abandon their core beliefs, rather than require stu-
dents to learn to accept that there will always be other people who do not 
share their beliefs. 
 186. Id. at 718–21 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 187. Richard Epstein, Church and State at the Crossroads: Christian Legal 
Society v. Martinez, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 105, 107. 
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assumption that “school officials knew better than [the courts] 
how to educate students in their charge.”188 
Despite the deep chasm between the liberal and conserva-
tive Justices in Martinez, all of them agreed that the right of 
the students to express any discriminatory views they wanted 
remained. “Although registered student groups must conform 
their conduct to the Law School’s regulation by dropping access 
barriers, they may express any viewpoint they wish—including 
a discriminatory one. . . . Today’s decision thus continues this 
Court’s tradition of ‘protect[ing] the freedom to express “the 
thought that we hate.”’”189 
The Court has never directly addressed whether universi-
ties may restrict their students’ off-campus speech consistent 
with the First Amendment. In Southworth, however, the Court 
did reject an argument that the university had no legitimate 
interest in supporting its students’ expressive activities off 
campus.190 In that case, a group of students argued that the 
university should not be permitted to require them to contrib-
ute to student activity fees. In rejecting their arguments that 
the support of extracurricular student speech was not “ger-
mane” to the university’s mission, the Court responded that 
such an inquiry was “unmanageable. . . . [P]articularly where 
the State undertakes to stimulate the whole universe of speech 
and ideas.”191 The Court added that “[i]t is not for the Court to 
say what is or is not germane to the ideas to be pursued in an 
institution of higher learning.”192 Furthermore, the Court re-
marked that “[u]niversities, like all of society, are finding that 
traditional conceptions of territorial boundaries are difficult to 
insist upon in an age marked by revolutionary changes in 
communications, information transfer, and the means of dis-
course.”193 
 
 188. Timothy J. Tracey, The Demise of Equal Access and a Return to the 
Early-American Understanding of Student Rights, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 557, 
636 (2013). 
 189. Martinez, 561 U.S. at 696–97 n.26 (quoting id. at 706 (Alito, J. dis-
senting)).  
 190. 529 U.S. 217, 234 (2000) (“We make no distinction between campus 
activities and the off-campus expressive activities of objectionable [student or-
ganizations] . . . find[ing] no principled way . . . to impose upon the University, 
as a constitutional matter, a requirement to adopt geographic or spatial re-
strictions.”). 
 191. Id. at 232. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 234. 
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One issue that has come up is whether college and univer-
sities should have the same authority to restrict speech in cur-
ricular and extracurricular matters. In Martinez, the majority 
rejected the argument that the university should receive less 
deference on its decisions relating to extracurricular activities 
because “extracurricular programs are, today, essential parts of 
the educational process.”194 Citing K–12 cases, the Court added 
that “[s]chools . . . enjoy ‘a significant measure of authority over 
the type of officially recognized activities in which their stu-
dents participate.’”195 
As this brief history demonstrates, the Court has been 
more solicitous of universities’ claims that the usual First 
Amendment rules should not apply on campus and that they 
are entitled to some measure of deference to determine what 
speech to permit consistent with their missions. The scope of 
this deference remains unclear. 
2. Academic Freedom 
In evaluating the ability public colleges and universities 
have to restrict or punish the speech of their students, an es-
sential consideration is how much deference should schools re-
ceive for the decisions they make. Amy Gajda contends that 
“courts today often wholly disregard or discount the signifi-
cance of the academic context in enforcing the First Amend-
ment.”196 She adds that when they do take the institutional con-
text into account, they tend to oversimplify and focus on 
students’ free speech rights without regard to the academic set-
ting.197 Although the Court has not been clear about how much 
deference universities should get when free speech rights are at 
issue, its decisions in the context of affirmative education sug-
gest this deference could be quite broad. 
As Part II reveals, public universities have a hard time re-
lying on traditional First Amendment doctrine to justify their 
efforts to restrict speech. But some scholars have argued that 
universities are entitled to some measure of deference when de-
termining what speech to tolerate on campus. This deference 
can be based on two different but related theories: (i) the aca-
 
 194. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law 
v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 687 (2010). 
 195. Id. at 686–87 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty Schs. v. 
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 240 (1990)). 
 196. GAJDA, supra note 39, at 108. 
 197. Id. 
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demic freedom of the university; and (ii) deference to an insti-
tutional actor. 
As Peter Byrne has colorfully put it, the doctrine of aca-
demic freedom “[l]ack[s] definition or guiding principle” and as 
a result, “the doctrine floats in the law, picking up decisions as 
a hull does barnacles.”198 Perhaps the most famous articulation 
of academic freedom came in Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence 
in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.199 Frankfurter wrote passionately 
about the importance of leaving universities unfettered “to ex-
amine, question, modify or reject traditional ideas and be-
liefs.”200 Quoting a statement about South African universities, 
Frankfurter wrote: “It is the business of a university to provide 
that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, exper-
iment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail 
‘the four essential freedoms’ of a university—to determine for 
itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be 
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to 
study.”201 Frankfurter was concerned about “governmental in-
trusion into the intellectual life of a university” that might di-
rectly or indirectly “check the ardor and fearlessness of schol-
ars.”202 
The government intrusion at issue in that case did not in-
volve the appropriateness of judicial review; instead, in that 
case, the New Hampshire legislature had questioned a profes-
sor about his “subversive” beliefs. If anything, Frankfurter’s 
concurrence—and Sweezy as a whole—suggests that the judici-
ary plays an important role in checking government attempts 
to interfere with academic freedom. At the same time, Frank-
furter’s opinion leaves open the possibility that students also 
enjoy some measure of academic freedom, although this idea 
has not gained much traction in the case law. In addition, one 
gaping hole in his opinion is how we should value and compare 
the academic freedom of the universities, professors, and stu-
dents when they are in conflict. 
 
 198. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First 
Amendment,” 99 YALE L.J. 251, 253 (1989). 
 199. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
 200. Id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting The Open Universi-
ties in South Africa 10–12 (a statement of a conference of senior scholars from 
the University of Cape Town and the University of the Witwatersrand)). 
 201. Id. at 263. 
 202. Id. at 261, 262. 
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One approach is to defer to universities to strike this bal-
ance for themselves.203 The Supreme Court has embraced some 
deference to universities in the context of admissions, tenure 
determinations, and academic standards. In Grutter v. Univer-
sity of Michigan, for example, the Supreme Court held that it 
was appropriate to “defer” to the law school’s “educational 
judgment” that “diversity is essential to its educational mis-
sion.”204 The Court held that judges must give a “degree of def-
erence to a university’s academic decisions, within constitu-
tionally prescribed limits.”205 In subsequent decisions, the Court 
made clear that, although strict scrutiny applies to affirmative 
action programs, “the decision to pursue ‘the educational bene-
fits that flow from student body diversity’ . . . is, in substantial 
measure, an academic judgment to which some, but not com-
plete, judicial deference is proper.”206 The Court explained that 
while universities cannot pursue racial quotas, “[o]nce . . . a 
university gives ‘a reasoned, principled explanation’ for its de-
cision, deference must be given ‘to the University’s conclusion, 
based on its experience and expertise, that a diverse student 
body would serve its educational goals.’”207 In rejecting argu-
ments that the university had failed to demonstrate that af-
firmative action was needed over and above its top-ten-percent 
admission plan, the Court referred to universities as “laborato-
ries for experimentation” that must be given “[c]onsiderable 
deference” to “defin[e] those intangible characteristics, like stu-
dent body diversity, that are central to its identity and educa-
tional mission.”208 
 
 203. See, e.g., PAUL HOWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 127 (2013) 
(arguing decisions regarding student speech are “matters of academic judg-
ment which ought to be left to the universities themselves”); Feldman, supra 
note 37 (“The balance between a civil educational community and academic 
freedom is subtle and difficult. But the First Amendment should be read to 
allow universities like Oklahoma to find that balance for themselves.”). 
 204. Grutter v. Univ. of Mich., 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). 
 205. Id. at 328. 
 206. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (Fisher II) (quot-
ing Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (Fisher I)). 
 207. Id. (quoting Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419). The Court has accepted that 
a diverse student body “promotes cross-racial understanding, helps to break 
down racial stereotypes, and enables students to better understand persons of 
different races.” Id. at 2210 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330). Diversity also 
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 208. Id. at. 2214 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (Ken-
nedy, J. concurring)). 
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The Court has also showed an unwillingness to interfere 
with curriculum decisions. In Board of Curators of the Universi-
ty of Missouri v. Horowitz, the Court rejected a procedural due 
process claim brought by a medical student dismissed from 
medical school at public university for her poor clinical perfor-
mance.209 In the course of determining that the school had af-
forded the student sufficient due process, the Court noted that 
for at least fifty years state and federal courts had distin-
guished between dismissals for “disciplinary reasons” and dis-
missals based on “academic” performance, holding that hear-
ings might be required for the former but not the later.210 The 
student argued she was entitled to a hearing because her dis-
missal was based in part on personal hygiene and timeliness 
issues, which are not, in her view, as “academic” issues. The 
Court rejected this argument, explaining that “[p]ersonal hy-
giene and timeliness may be as important factors in a school’s 
determination of whether a student will make a good medical 
doctor as the student’s ability to take a case history or diagnose 
an illness.”211 The Court stated that “the determination whether 
to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert 
evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily 
adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative de-
cision making.”212 As a result, the Court concluded that an ad-
versarial hearing would “risk deterioration” of the “faculty-
student relationship.”213 
The limits of the deference embraced in Grutter are un-
clear. For example, relying heavily on Grutter, the AAUP ar-
gued in Rumsfeld v. FAIR that instilling values is part of a uni-
versity education, and consequently academic freedom includes 
not just decisions relating to teaching and research but also 
“the standards and methods that faculties bring to bear to 
shape the educational environment outside the classroom, in-
cluding by modeling and instilling professional values that stu-
dents will carry into postgraduate employment.”214 Indeed, the 
 
 209. 435 U.S. 78 (1978). 
 210. Id. at 91 n.6. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 90. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Brief for Amicus Curiae the Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors (AAUP), 
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AAUP contends that pretty much everything a university does 
“throughout the educational environment” enjoys academic 
freedom.215 The AAUP argued that universities are entitled to 
deference in their decisions relating to career replacement.216 To 
support this argument, the AAUP relied on statements in 
Grutter that one of the purposes of universities is to prepare 
students for post-graduate employment.217 
B. TROUBLING RELIANCE ON K–12 CASES 
The Supreme Court has decided four cases relating to the 
free speech rights of students in public primary and secondary 
schools. These cases leave open a number of important ques-
tions, including the issue of when schools can punish students 
for speech that does not take place on school grounds or as part 
of a school-sponsored activity. The Supreme Court has never 
explicitly determined whether this series of cases applies in the 
university setting, but some lower courts have done so. 
1. Tinker and Fraser 
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, the 
Court famously held that students and teachers do not “shed 
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at 
the schoolhouse gate.”218 The Court emphasized that schools 
could not be “enclaves of totalitarianism” and that student 
speech played an important role in the “marketplace of ide-
as.”219 At the same time, the Court said that a determination of 
the student speech rights must be made “in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment.”220 Schools cannot re-
strict speech based on an “undifferentiated fear or apprehen-
sion of disturbance” because all expression poses the risk of an 
 
University, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 929, 951 (2006) (“Inculcation of human values 
or modeling of professional values, while legitimate, do not stand at the center 
of higher education; investigation, discussion, critique, and judgment do.”). 
 215. Brief for AAUP as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 
214, at *9. 
 216. Id. FAIR itself involved a challenge to the Solomon Amendment, 
which threatened universities with the loss of federal funding if they excluded 
military recruiters from campus. 
 217. Id. at *12 (“We have repeatedly acknowledged the overriding im-
portance of preparing students for work and citizenship. . . .” (quoting Grutter 
v. Bolinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331–32 (2003)). 
 218. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 219. Id. at 511–12. 
 220. Id. at 506. 
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argument or disturbance.221 But school officials can act when 
they “reasonably forecast”222 that the expression will cause a 
“material and substantial interference with schoolwork or dis-
cipline,”223 or that the speech “inv[ades] the rights of others.”224 
The Court concluded that the school had failed to demonstrate 
that students wearing black armbands satisfied this stand-
ard.225 
Although Tinker is often regarded as the high-water mark 
for student speech rights, in recent years courts have applied 
the “substantial disruption” standard expansively to give 
schools broad authority to restrict their students’ speech 
rights.226 Lower courts have held that schools can restrict 
speech even if there is no evidence of actual disruption; instead, 
a reasonable prediction that the speech at issue would result in 
a substantial disruption would be enough. In some courts, this 
disruption can even be an inconvenience to the administrators, 
who have to deal with the students, parents, and broad com-
munity reacting to the speech.227 
In addition, Tinker ’s statement that schools can restrict 
speech that “invades the rights of others”228 has begun to gain 
traction in the lower courts, although it remains very contro-
versial. What this language means is unclear, and there are 
very few decisions discussing it. If “the rights of others”229 prong 
does more than simply underscore that schools can prohibit 
speech that is otherwise unprotected under the First Amend-
ment (such as fighting words or true threats), then this ap-
proach does not add much. It is also does not add much given 
that the “substantial disruption”230 standard allows schools to 
act if speech interferes with a student’s ability to learn.231 But 
 
 221. Id. at 508. 
 222. Id. at 514. 
 223. Id. at 511. 
 224. Id. at 513. 
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 227. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 228. Brief for AAUP as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 
214. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 514. 
 231. See, e.g., Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. #204, 523 F.3d 668, 674 
(7th Cir. 2008) (“[I]f there is reason to think that a particular type of student 
speech will lead to a decline in students’ test scores, an upsurge in truancy, or 
  
2017] RIGHTS OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS 1841 
 
at least one court has held that the “rights of others” prong of 
Tinker can offer a substantial alternative basis for punishing 
student speech.232 In Harper v. Poway Unified School District, 
the Ninth Circuit relied on this prong to uphold a school’s cen-
sorship of a t-shirt with a biblical verse and an anti-gay mes-
sage.233 A searing Judge Kozinski dissent attacked the majority 
for embracing such a standardless and malleable approach to 
student speech.234 
The Supreme Court has cited Tinker in some of its univer-
sity speech cases, but it has never relied on the Tinker stand-
ard to restrict speech. In Healy, discussed above, the Court cit-
ed Tinker repeatedly, both for its broad pronouncement that 
students do not abandon their First Amendment rights at the 
schoolhouse gates and also for its recognition that First 
Amendment rights can vary depending on the “special charac-
teristics” of the environment in which they are asserted.235 But 
the Court issued a rather speech-protective decision, suggesting 
that the “special characteristics” language had little impact on 
the Court’s determination of the case.236 Papish also cited the 
language (although not the case name) but likewise strongly re-
jected the university’s arguments that the usual rules of the 
First Amendment did not apply on college campuses.237 In 
Widmar, the Court favorably cited Tinker ’s holding that the 
First Amendment must be applied “in light of the special char-
acteristics of the school environment,”238 but only to emphasize 
that a school need not open its facilities “to students and non-
 
other symptoms of a sick school—symptoms therefore of substantial disrup-
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students alike.”239 The Court made clear that “students enjoy 
First Amendment rights of speech and association on . . . cam-
pus” and any denial of their rights is subject to the usual strin-
gent levels of scrutiny in non-university cases.240 
The lower courts have not discussed at great length wheth-
er Tinker applies in the university setting. The Third Circuit is 
one of the few courts to suggest that because Tinker arose out 
of the K–12 context, it does not establish the proper framework 
for analyzing student speech claims in the higher education en-
vironment.241 In DeJohn, the court declared that university offi-
cials have less leeway than public elementary or high school of-
ficials to restrict student speech and held that the following 
speech code was overbroad and therefore unconstitutional: 
[A]ll forms of sexual harassment are prohibited, including . . . expres-
sive, visual, or physical conduct of a sexual or gender-motivated na-
ture, when . . . (c) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreason-
ably interfering with an individual’s work, educational performance, 
or status; or (d) such conduct has the purpose or effect of creating an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment.242 
The Third Circuit held that this policy was unconstitutional be-
cause it permitted the punishment of speech that had the “pur-
pose” or motive of causing an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
environment even if it does not in fact create a hostile envi-
ronment.243 The court explained that the code therefore does not 
even meet the Tinker test, which requires the school to show 
the speech poses a substantial risk of “actual, material disrup-
tion.”244 In addition, the court criticized the policy for failing to 
include a requirement that the speech create severe and perva-
sive hostile educational environment; without such a require-
ment, the code “provides no shelter for core protected speech.”245 
 
 239. Id. 
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Since Tinker, the Court has clawed back on the student 
speech rights at school. This process began in Bethel School 
District No. 403 v. Fraser, where the Court held that schools 
could punish students for “plainly offensive” speech.246 At issue 
in Fraser was a speech with sexual innuendos a student gave at 
a school assembly.247 The Court did not rely on Tinker ’s sub-
stantial disruption or invasion of the rights of others justifica-
tions; instead, the decision appeared to give schools authority 
to restrict speech in order to promote “socially appropriate be-
havior.”248 The Court emphasized the importance of deferring to 
public schools’ “basic educational mission”249 to “[inculcate] fun-
damental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic 
political system.”250 Subsequent Court opinions make clear that 
schools can punish speech at school that would be fully protect-
ed if made outside of school.251 
It appears quite clear that Fraser itself would have come 
out differently if a public university student had made the 
speech at issue. College and university students do not need to 
be sheltered from “bad words” or sexually suggestive language. 
That said, Fraser ’s emphasis on affording K–12 schools leeway 
to restrict speech in order to promote their “basic educational 
mission” does have possible resonance in the higher education 
setting. 
2. Hazelwood and the Government Speech Doctrine 
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court gave 
schools the authority to restrict student expression in any 
school-sponsored forum—including “school-sponsored publica-
tions, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities 
that students, parents, and members of the public might rea-
sonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school” as long 
as the school’s actions are “reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”252 One reason the Court gave for giving 
schools such broad authority was that high school students are 
not emotionally mature and likely to be inappropriately influ-
enced by speech on controversial issues that they believe the 
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school endorses.253 Echoing Fraser, the Court once again stated 
that federal courts should defer to the decisions of school ad-
ministrators to restrict speech that is inconsistent with its 
basic educational mission.254 
Hazelwood specifically left open the question “whether the 
same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-
sponsored expressive activities at the college and university 
level.”255 The Supreme Court has cited Hazelwood in a handful 
of higher education decisions,256 and lower courts have frequent-
ly held that Hazelwood should apply in that context as well, es-
pecially in cases involving curriculum decisions.257 Courts ex-
plain that the reasoning of Hazelwood is equally applicable to 
the university setting because universities have traditionally 
exercised control over speech that occurs as part of the curricu-
lum, and this speech clearly bears the “imprimatur” of the uni-
versity.258 In addition, courts have reasoned that it is appropri-
ate to give the substantial deference to curricular decisions that 
Hazelwood mandates because schools plainly must be able to 
exercise all sorts of control over the curriculum in order to 
teach students effectively; thus, viewpoint-based decisions are 
inevitable.259 These courts contend that Tinker ’s substantial 
disruption standard would not be sufficient to protect the edu-
cational process.260 
Even in the context of curriculum decisions, however, not 
all courts—and certainly not all judges—have agreed Hazel-
wood should apply. In one particularly significant dissent, 
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Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit argued that it is inappro-
priate to apply a standard the Supreme Court established for 
“emotionally less mature high school students” in cases involv-
ing higher education, where “academic freedom and vigorous 
debate are supposed to flourish.”261 
Another concern related to the application of Hazelwood to 
the university context is how deferential the standard is usual-
ly applied. This deference stands in contrast to other educa-
tional contexts where courts have required universities to give 
more detailed explanations for their refusals to accommodate 
requests for curricular deviations. In Wynne v. Tufts University 
School of Medicine, for example, the First Circuit affirmed 
summary judgment for the university when it was sued for re-
fusing to give a student an oral exam instead of a written exam 
in biochemistry only after it had “demythologized the institu-
tional thought processes leading to its determination.”262 The 
court required the institution to demonstrate that the accom-
modation “would result in either lowering academic standards 
or requiring substantial program alteration.”263 Even in the 
context of the sort of “genuinely academic decision,” the court 
required the university to show that it had engaged in “rea-
soned deliberations” before deferring to “the faculty’s profes-
sional judgment.”264 The court demanded this sort of reasoned 
decision-making even though there was no allegation in that 
case that the university had asserted pedagogical reasons as a 
pretext for discrimination. 
One open question for many courts is whether the Hazel-
wood test can be used in higher education cases involving ex-
tracurricular activities.265 The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion 
authored by Judge Easterbrook, has held that the deferential 
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 262. Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., (Wynne II) 976 F.2d 791, 795 (1st 
Cir. 1992). 
 263. Id. at 793. 
 264. Wynne v. Tufts (Wynne I), 932 F.2d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
Applying the principles of Wynne I and Wynne II, a federal district court in 
Massachusetts rejected a claim that Boston University must allow a student 
to substitute another course for the foreign language requirement, but only 
after a diverse committee met seven times to discuss whether a foreign lan-
guage requirement was important for a liberal arts education. See 
Guckenberger v. Bos. Univ., 8 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 265. See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1289–90 (suggesting it is not appropri-
ate to apply Hazelwood outside of curricular context); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 
F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that educators have traditionally en-
joyed more deference in the curricular than extracurricular setting). 
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standard of Hazelwood makes sense outside of the curricular 
context: “Extracurricular activities may be outside any public 
forum . . . without falling outside all university governance. Let 
us not forget that academic freedom includes the authority of 
the university to manage an academic community and evaluate 
teaching and scholarship free from interference by other units 
of government, including the courts.”266 Other courts have disa-
greed. For example, the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, reasoned 
that Hazelwood applied “only marginally” when a public uni-
versity confiscated the school-funded, student-produced year-
book.267 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the 
readers of the yearbook were likely to be young adults, not 
children, and that “[t]he university is a special place for pur-
poses of First Amendment jurisprudence.”268 
Some lower courts have recognized that Hazelwood at least 
in part is based on giving schools the power to control speech 
that is reasonably regarded as bearing their “imprimatur.”269 
Although Hazelwood predated the development of the govern-
ment speech doctrine, it appears to be closely related to it. The 
precise contours of the government speech doctrine are unclear, 
but the basic idea is that the First Amendment does not apply 
when the government itself is speaking. 
The government speech doctrine allows state actors to 
speak without the usual First Amendment limitations. In many 
situations, this doctrine supports our common-sense under-
standings—for example, the U.S. Surgeon General should not 
have to issue statements both supporting and condemning the 
use of tobacco products—but most of its applications have been 
controversial. The government speech doctrine is reflected in 
cases like Garcetti, where the Court has said that public em-
ployers should be able to control whatever employees say in the 
course of performing their job duties—and in student speech 
cases like Hazelwood, which allow schools to restrict speech 
that “bears the school’s imprimatur.”270 
 
 266. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 267. Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 
 268. Id. at 352. 
 269. See, e.g., Corlett v. Oakland Univ. Bd. of Trs., 958 F. Supp.2d 795, 806 
(E.D. Mich. 2013) (“Hazelwood applies only where the speech in question rea-
sonably could be construed as representing the school’s own viewpoint.”). 
 270. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kulhmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
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The Supreme Court has struggled to define when the gov-
ernment speech doctrine is implicated. In its most recent gov-
ernment speech case, Walker v. Texas, the Court appeared to 
set up a three-part test: (1) the relevant history; (2) the amount 
of government control over speech; and (3) whether a reasona-
ble person would believe the government is speaking.271 In 
Walker itself, the Court held that Texas’s specialty license 
plates constituted government speech.272 This decision was re-
markable for many reasons, but let it suffice to note that it is 
hard to believe, as Justice Alito argued in dissent, that a rea-
sonable person would believe that Texas supports the Universi-
ty of Florida sports program or thinks that we all should be 
golfing instead of driving.273 Walker has potentially huge impli-
cations for speech rights of university students.274 
Although Walker appears to set forth a three-part test, the 
history and control prongs are really in service of the third: 
whether a reasonable observer would believe the government is 
speaking. One would hope in the university context, it would be 
easy enough for students to argue that it is not, in fact, reason-
able for anyone to assume that their speech is the speech of the 
school. As Justice O’Connor once said, “The proposition that 
schools do not endorse everything they fail to censor is not 
complicated.”275 But the problem with the reasonable observer 
inquiry, as with Hazelwood’s “imprimatur” inquiry, is that it is 
incredibly elastic. In the context of specialty license plates, it is 
hard to imagine any reasonable person believing that the 400 
different types of specialty license plates represent the State of 
Texas. Nevertheless, relying in part on the answers to the his-
tory and control inquiry, the Court concluded that a reasonable 
person might in fact reach that conclusion. After all, a reasona-
ble person who does not understand the government’s obliga-
tions under the public forum doctrine might erroneously as-
sume that the government endorses any speech that appears on 
its property. 
 
 271. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). 
 272. Id. at 2253. 
 273. Id. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 274. For a lengthier discussion of the uncertain implications of Walker, see 
Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Government Brand, 110 NW. L. REV. 1195, 1226–
34 (2016). 
 275. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 
(1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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In some lower court student speech cases, courts have con-
cluded that granting a student a degree itself bears the impri-
matur of the school. These courts usually recognize that the 
underlying speech at issue—like a student’s Facebook posts—
does not itself bear the imprimatur of the school, but the deci-
sion to graduate students despite what they have posted indi-
cates a “certification” that these students are suitable to enter 
the profession.276 
3. Morse v. Frederick 
One more K–12 case bears mention: Morse v. Frederick. In 
that case, the Court held that public schools could restrict 
speech that is reasonably interpreted to promote drug use.277 
Although the Court emphasized the “special characteristics of 
the school environment” that limit student speech rights, the 
Court rejected arguments that the First Amendment permits 
schools to restrict any speech that they might determine is of-
fensive to the school’s educational mission.278 At the same time, 
the Court has made clear that schools are not entitled to re-
strict speech whenever it interferes with their “educational 
mission.” The Court expressed concerned that such a standard 
would be too vague and result in the suppression of too much 
speech because “much political and religious speech might be 
perceived as offensive to some.”279 
All of the Court’s K–12 cases involve speech that occurred 
on school grounds or during a school-sponsored activity. As a 
result, they give very little guidance to lower courts grappling 
with the difficult issues arising in digital communications such 
as e-mails, blogs, and social media.280 Although most courts rec-
ognize the difficulties of applying Fraser and Morse to speech 
that does not appear at school,281 the courts are deeply split 
about whether and how to apply the Court’s K–12 school speech 
 
 276. For an excellent discussion of these cases, see Emily Gold Waldman, 
University Imprimaturs on Student Speech: The Certification Cases, 11 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 382, 393–98 (2013). 
 277. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 278. Id. at 408. 
 279. Id. at 409. 
 280. In Morse, the Court recognized that the lower courts disagreed about 
when schools have authority to restrict speech outside of school. See id. at 401 
(“There is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts should 
apply school speech precedents . . . but not on these facts.”). 
 281. Papandrea, supra note 226, at 1069–70. 
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cases in this context.282 Accordingly, even if these cases were 
applicable to the higher education setting they do not answer 
the question of how much power public schools should have to 
interfere with their students’ “off campus” speech. 
4. Problems with Applying K–12 Cases to Higher Education 
There are some very good reasons to doubt whether any of 
the K–12 cases should apply in the higher education context.  
Primary and secondary education is significantly different 
from higher education. The students in K–12 are (for the most 
part) minors, while students in higher education are (for the 
most part) adults. While there are some unresolved questions 
regarding the First Amendment rights of minors even outside 
of the First Amendment context,283 there is no question that 
university students enjoy the same full First Amendment 
rights as other adults. Although divide between “childhood” 
and “adulthood” is somewhat randomly set at eighteen for 
many (but not all) legal purposes, and recent scientific evidence 
suggests the development of the human brain continues 
through the mid-20s, the fact remains that in our society, indi-
viduals over eighteen are indeed generally recognized to be ful-
ly developed individuals. At the very least, people who are 
eighteen have the right to vote, and if nothing else, the right to 
engage in free speech—and the duty to endure offensive 
speech—should accompany that right. That some high school 
 
 282. Id. at 1056–69. For more recent decisions, see, for example, Bell v. 
Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 389–96 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that 
the school could punish a student for speech on his social media page because 
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threatening, harassing, and intimidating); J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 
650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that a school violated the First 
Amendment when it suspended a student who had created a fake online pro-
file mocking the principal); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 
570–75 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that the First Amendment permitted a school 
to punish one of its students for creating a MySpace page mocking another 
student); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216–19 (3d Cir. 
2011) (holding that a school violated the First Amendment by disciplining a 
student who created a fake online profile of the principal on her home comput-
er). 
 283. The Court has held that the First Amendment permits some re-
strictions on the speech children receive. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 
U.S. 629 (1968). The Court has never directly held that children have more 
limited rights to speak, but some argue that because children are subject to 
the authority of their parents and do not possess the right to vote, their right 
to speak is not co-extensive with adults. For more discussion of this argument, 
see Papandrea, supra note 226. 
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students are adults and some university students are minors 
does not necessarily argue in favor of reducing the speech 
rights of university students; it could just as easily argue in fa-
vor of recognizing more robust speech rights of high school stu-
dents. 
One reason some give for affording even K–12 students ro-
bust First Amendment rights at school is that primary and sec-
ondary school education is compulsory in every State, and the 
only choices students and families have to avoid schools with 
speech restrictions with which they disagree is private or paro-
chial school, or home schooling. Students attending public uni-
versities often face similar constraints in where they attend 
school. Public universities cost far less than comparable private 
universities, particularly for in-state students, and transferring 
from one university to another involves tremendous costs, both 
financial and otherwise. Furthermore, it is hardly justifiable to 
tell a university student that he or she does not have to go to 
college or graduate school. At the same time, we do not allow 
people to argue that speech on their local streets and sidewalks 
should be restricted because it is difficult to move to another 
city; it is not entirely clear why the analysis should be any dif-
ferent in the university setting. In most instances, the speech is 
not directed to any particular students, and students who find 
the speech offensive are not a captive audience. 
Those who argue in favor of speech restrictions argue that 
universities, or at least parts of a university, are “home” for the 
students. Indeed, many universities are residential, providing 
housing for some of their students, and at many, students are 
required to live in campus housing for some period of time. This 
means that students do not just spend a portion of their day on 
campus; they eat, drink, and sleep on campus. This tension be-
tween protecting a vigorous marketplace of ideas and creating 
a comfortable “home” for students was dramatically on display 
in a controversy at Yale over Halloween costumes. A group of 
university administrators signed a letter urging students to be 
culturally sensitive when selecting their Halloween costumes.284 
A Yale instructor was who was also the “master” of Silliman 
College—one of the residential colleges at Yale—criticized the 
wisdom of this admonition and faced student attacks. In a mo-
ment captured on video, a student confronted the master in the 
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residential college courtyard and yelled that her job was “to 
create a place of comfort and home” for the students and not 
about creating “an intellectual space.”285 The instructor ulti-
mately resigned from Yale.286 
These arguments about the university as a “home,” howev-
er, point just as readily, and perhaps even more strongly, in fa-
vor of protecting the rights of the speakers. At least in the K–12 
context, students (theoretically) retain their full First Amend-
ment rights when they go home. Even the lower courts that 
have upheld school punishment of off-campus K–12 speech 
have done so after finding some nexus with the school itself. 
Students residing on college campuses cannot retreat to their 
“homes” to exercise their full First Amendment rights. 
Another reason given for affording K–12 students reduced 
First Amendment protections at school is because the schools 
are acting in loco parentis. The Supreme Court itself has given 
mixed messages on this rationale; it has rejected it in the 
speech context, but it has embraced it in the Fourth Amend-
ment context.287 Whatever the merits of this argument in the 
K–12 context, it has no merit in the college and university con-
text. Interestingly, it is true that historically it was commonly 
understood that higher education institutions did have the 
same rights and responsibilities as the parents of their stu-
dents, but ever since the 1960s, when universities tried to pun-
ish students for participating in a civil rights movement, this 
theory has lost traction.288 In addition, the doctrine was out of 
place as sprawling research universities became more preva-
lent, and students were no longer under close supervision.289 It 
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is generally agreed that colleges and universities no longer 
have a custodial relationship with their students; it is purely 
educational.290 
Although the wholesale application of the Court’s K–12 ju-
risprudence would make little sense, one aspect of these cases 
would. In Morse, the Court sharply rejected the school’s argu-
ment that it should be entitled to restrict speech whenever it 
interfered with the “mission” of the school. The Court was con-
cerned that schools would readily engage in viewpoint-based 
discrimination against disfavored messages in the light of pro-
tecting its mission, and thereby eviscerate meaningful First 
Amendment protection for students. It is not clear why univer-
sities would be given more deference to restrict speech in keep-
ing with their self-defined “educational missions” than local 
primary and secondary schools. 
C. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE CASES 
Some lower courts, particularly in the K–12 context, have 
relied on the Court’s government employee cases to determine 
the speech rights of students. This line of cases is ill-suited for 
the higher education setting. 
Increasingly courts have embraced the public employee 
framework in the university setting when students are involved 
in externships or clinical placements.291 In Watts v. Florida In-
ternational University, for example, a student seeking a degree 
in social work was fired from his field placement for “inappro-
priate behavior related to patients, regarding religion” after he 
told a patient that she could seek a bereavement support group 
in a church.292 In Snyder v. Millersville University, an education 
student was no longer permitted to do her student teaching at a 
local high school when the school administrators discovered 
photos she had posted on her MySpace webpage of herself 
dressed as a pirate holding a plastic cup and the caption 
“Drunken Pirate.”293 In both cases, the students could not re-
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ceive their degrees because the field placements were required 
for graduation. In evaluating their free speech claims, the lower 
courts assumed the framework for public employees would ap-
ply to the students’ free speech claims against their universi-
ties, as if they had sued their field placement supervisors di-
rectly. 
The Court’s public employment cases, which give govern-
ment employees broad authority to restrict speech, are based 
on an assumption that when the government is acting as an 
employer, it should have the power to restrict speech that inter-
feres with the proper and efficient function of the workplace. 
This is why the Court has held that speech related to an em-
ployee’s job duties enjoys absolutely no constitutional protec-
tion,294 and that public employers can punish their employees 
for any speech that does not relate to a matter of public con-
cern.295 Although the Court has recognized that employees (like 
students) do not entirely forfeit their First Amendment rights 
by taking a job with the government,296 the protections they en-
joy are extraordinarily limited. I have argued elsewhere that 
this framework is problematic, but regardless, it is a poor fit for 
evaluating the interests at stake in the higher education set-
ting. 
D. PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 
An increasingly popular argument for the power of univer-
sities to limit their students’ speech rights is that the re-
strictions are consistent with professional standards. These ar-
guments have come into play not just in professional schools 
(like law and medicine) but also undergraduate programs that 
prepare students for certain careers, like teaching and even 
mortuary science.297 
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The argument in favor of professionalism standards is that 
the mission of the schools is to prepare students for a particular 
profession, and the failure to abide by certain professionalism 
standards indicates an unsuitability for the profession. 
One of the best examples of a case where a professionalism 
standard was used is Tatro v. University of Minnesota, where a 
mortuary science student suffered significant disciplinary sanc-
tions for making posts on her Facebook page about her experi-
ence in anatomy lab.298 The Supreme Court of Minnesota held 
that “a university does not violate the free speech rights of a 
student enrolled in a professional program when the university 
imposes sanctions for Facebook posts that violate academic 
program rules that are narrowly tailored and directly related to 
established professional conduct standards.”299 
Although the opinion cites the standard for strict scrutiny, 
its analysis was anything but. The court concluded that the 
student had violated an anatomy lab course rule providing that 
“conversational language of cadaver dissection outside the la-
boratory” should be “respectful and discreet,” but “‘blogging’ 
about the anatomy lab or the cadaver dissection” was prohibit-
ed.300 “Blogging” included any speech on Facebook or Twitter.301 
It is hard to see how this rule is a narrowly tailored rule. It 
would cover “the entire broad class of responsible, sensitive, 
thoroughly professional blog posts” relating to genuine matters 
of public concern, as well as blog posts that were entirely in-
nocuous.302 In addition, the court concluded that this rule was 
“directly related to established professional conduct standards” 
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only after “[g]iving deference to the curriculum decisions of the 
University . . . .”303 
Tatro specifically held that neither Tinker nor Hazelwood 
provided the relevant legal standard for analysis and remarka-
bly relied on Morse and Fraser to support its creation of an en-
tirely new “professionalism” standard.304 The court explained 
that Tinker did not apply because the sanctions were not im-
posed because the Facebook posts created a substantial disrup-
tion on campus or within the mortuary program.305 Hazelwood 
was inapplicable, too, the court held, because no one would rea-
sonably believe that Tatro’s posts were school-sponsored 
speech; in addition, the test was too permissive for the college 
setting because it would potentially allow the school to censor 
speech “to cover values like ‘discipline, courtesy, and respect for 
authority.’”306 Tellingly, the court relied on Morse and Fraser to 
support its conclusion that First Amendment rights must be 
considered in light of the “special characteristics of the school 
environment.”307 Here, the court concluded, the relevant school 
environment was a professional school environment, which 
means the university “is entitled to set and enforce reasonable 
course standards designed to teach professional norms.”308 
Although the court apparently thought this professional-
ism standard offered students more speech protection than the 
Hazelwood test, it is probably a tie at best. Under Hazelwood, 
students can challenge speech restrictions by arguing that the 
school did not have a legitimate pedagogical concern or that the 
speech would not be reasonably regarded as bearing the 
school’s imprimatur. Under a professionalism standard, a stu-
dent might argue that the professional standards at issue simp-
ly do not exist, are themselves unconstitutional, or 
pretextual.309 
In these professionalism cases, the lower courts have re-
jected arguments that schools have less—or no—authority to 
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restrict online speech. As noted earlier, lower courts are deeply 
divided in the K–12 setting about whether and when schools 
can punish their students’ online speech. In the professionalism 
cases, the courts tend to dodge that issue entirely by reasoning 
that any speech, no matter where it is published, can demon-
strate a failure to comply with professional standards.310 
These professionalism arguments have an elastic character 
and threaten to encompass virtually any decision a school 
might make. In Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, an acting student 
brought a First Amendment claim against the University of 
Utah after she was punished for refusing to use profanity or 
take God’s name in vain in acting class.311 The school claimed 
that these exercises were part of its “methodology for preparing 
students for careers in professional acting.”312 The school lost its 
motion for summary judgment because there was evidence in 
the record suggesting that this “professionalism” justification 
was pretext for religious discrimination.313 
In Rumsfeld v. FAIR, for example, the AAUP argued in its 
amicus brief that law schools must be permitted to exclude em-
ployees who discriminate because it is against the rules of pro-
fessional conduct for lawyers to engage in discrimination.314 In a 
University of North Carolina School of Law Halloween costume 
controversy, the law school administration suggested that cul-
turally insensitive costumes were not consistent with profes-
sional values.315 These two examples suggest the potential 
breadth of a professionalism standard, which would allow a 
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public university or college to justify all sorts of speech re-
strictions. 
IV.  LIMITING DEFERENCE TO THE UNIVERSITY   
Granting public colleges and universities broad deference 
to restrict their students’ expressive activities is problematic on 
a number of levels. As one commentator has argued, they are 
“astonishingly poor guarantors of the First Amendment when 
hateful or offensive speech is at issue.”316 
At the root of this question is “an impoverished under-
standing of the unique and complex functions performed by our 
universities.”317 The university does not possess any special 
right under the mantle of academic freedom to restrict student 
speech as it sees fit. Instead, any speech restrictions must be 
limited, as Peter Bryne has argued, to those “necessary to the 
functions of higher education” in the pursuit of “truth and the 
controvertibility of dogma.”318 
Although the similarities between curricular and extracur-
ricular activities may seem arbitrary, it makes perfect sense to 
give colleges and universities more leeway to control what hap-
pens in the classroom than in the dormitories, on the playing 
fields, and on Facebook. As Justice Stevens argued in his 
Widmar concurrence, universities have to make content-based 
decisions all the time: “They select books for inclusion in the li-
brary, they hire professors on the basis of their academic phi-
losophies, they select courses for inclusion in the curriculum, 
and they reward scholars for what they have written.”319 Apply-
ing standard First Amendment doctrine to these decisions 
would be virtually impossible and inconsistent with the aca-
demic enterprise. These sorts of decisions also seem at the core 
of academic freedom, no matter how that doctrine is defined. 
But even with respect to decisions relating to the curricu-
lum, the deference the university receives should not be abso-
lute. Professors should be given wide latitude to restrict class-
room speech that is disruptive to the learning environment, as 
Tinker imagined, but this disruption should be actual and not 
 
 316. Juhan, supra note 65, at 1595. 
 317. Byrne, supra note 198, at 254. 
 318. Id. at 264–65. 
 319. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278 (Stevens, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Stevens also mentioned that schools offering extracurricular activities 
have to determine “the content of those activities.” Id. 
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merely speculative. Even in the classroom setting, professors 
may inappropriately prohibit certain points of view or punish 
students whose views are not in the mainstream. 
Permitting schools to rely on professionalism standards to 
deny students credit or a diploma is very dangerous. First, pro-
fessionalism standards themselves are hardly free from First 
Amendment controversy. A recent flood of literature is address-
ing the constitutionality of such standards.320 Even putting to 
one side questions about what level of scrutiny to give such 
rules, the rules themselves can be vague and independently 
unenforceable. Tatro offers a perfect example of a case where 
the professional rules mandating “respect” for the dead argua-
bly interferes with the freedom of expression. Such a rule is of 
dubious constitutionality whether it applies to a student or a 
practicing mortician. Furthermore, the professionalism stand-
ards are vague and subject to abuse. While in some instances 
the failure to behave professionally at an internship should be 
grounds for denying credit, a lack of professional speech gener-
ally should rarely be grounds for denying a student a diploma. 
Schools should take care to distinguish, as appropriate, the dif-
ference between graduating a student for fulfilling the curricu-
lar requirements for a degree and certifying a student for ad-
mission to licensure. The two decisions are not equivalent, and 
they should not be treated as equivalent. 
Professors and universities should not be given broad pow-
er to restrict speech outside of the classroom setting unless that 
speech is unprotected speech, as outlined in Part II, or meets 
the “severe and pervasive” and “objectively offensive” standard 
for hostile learning environment claims under Title VI or Title 
IX. 
Rather than trying to make the campus as a whole a “safe 
space” free of offensive speech, public colleges and universities 
should support affinity groups where students can gain support 
from those who share their views and background. With this 
support, these students can gain confidence to enter the larger 
debates occurring on campus. The “all-comers” policy in Mar-
tinez undermines how the right of association can contribute to 
a robust speech environment on campus. To be sure, the right 
of association is not absolute, and it can give way to anti-
 
 320. See, e.g., Timothy Zick, Professional Rights Speech, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
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ment protections or concerns.”). 
  
2017] RIGHTS OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS 1859 
 
discrimination laws, particularly when the organization’s core 
identity is not offended by an all-comers policy.321 But affinity 
groups, single-sex fraternities and sororities, religious groups 
and other groups where limits on membership are closely relat-
ed to the purposes of the organization should not be required to 
admit members who will undermine the purposes of the associ-
ation.322 
Limiting the ability public colleges and universities have to 
punish or censor speech does not mean that they are powerless 
to respond when student speech is offensive and undermines 
the school’s core values. Instead, they should not be afraid to 
condemn that speech and explain why that speech is offensive 
to the school’s values. The school should use the offensive 
speech as a moment to educate the student body. 
One recent example is instructive of the approach to stu-
dent speech that this Article advocates. Recently at the public 
law school where I teach, the administration was asked to take 
action when unknown students crossed out “Black Lives Mat-
ter” and wrote “All Lives Matter” on a poster on the school’s 
“Free Speech” bulletin board.323 Some students called for an in-
vestigation into the identity of the defacer and swift punish-
ment. It proved impossible to identify the culprit, but neverthe-
less the administration, working with students, quickly called a 
town hall meeting to discuss the incident. At this meeting, the 
school came together to talk about why marking up the sign 
was so hurtful to some students. In this forum, the administra-
tion heard from African-American students who said they liter-
ally fear for their lives when they are driving their cars. Other 
 
 321. But see Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 651 (2000) (holding 
the Boy Scouts were not required to allow a homosexual assistant scoutmaster 
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students expressed frustration with the Free Speech Board as a 
medium of communication because it did not foster dialogue 
among people holding diverse views. By the end of the meeting, 
it became strikingly clear that the incident on the Free Speech 
Board was symptomatic of a larger issue at the law school, 
which was the lack of dialogue on racial justice issues and 
stratification and isolation of white and black students. The 
path forward is hardly clear, but what is clear is that censoring 
students who disagree with the Black Lives Matter movement 
will not solve the issues facing the law school. Instead, censor-
ship would simply put a band aid over the problem and poten-
tially inflame the hostility of students who are silenced for 
their own views. 
Rather than misusing Hazelwood and the government 
speech doctrine to interfere with the free speech rights of their 
students, public colleges and universities should use their voic-
es to engage in unmistakably government speech to condemn 
speech that interferes with the core values and mission of the 
institution.324 It is when the institution fails to stand up for its 
core values and mission that those values and mission are most 
threatened. 
  CONCLUSION   
As the President of Brown University Christina Paxson 
has said, what universities do is “difficult and important” be-
cause “we live in a society that often feels more divided and 
rancorous than ever, fractured along lines of race, ethnicity, in-
come, and ideology.”325 Public universities and colleges need to 
recognize that some of their students are suffering, and not on-
ly when they are at school. The answer to this pain, however, is 
not stifling free speech but embracing it. With a continued 
commitment to the foundational free speech principles and a 
recognition that our universities are the marketplace of ideas, 
higher education institutions can feel comfortable rejecting 
 
 324. PEN America recently embraced this same message. See PEN AM., 
supra note 4 (“When a university’s values are breached, its precepts threat-
ened, or its constituents violated in a significant way, it is incumbent on top 
administrators to speak out.”). 
 325. Christina Paxson, Brown University President: A Safe Space for Free-
dom of Expression, WASH. POST. (Sept. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/opinions/brown-university-president-safe-spaces-dont-threaten-freedom 
-of-expression-they-protect-it/2016/09/05/6201870e-736a-11e6-8149 
-b8d05321db62_story.html. 
  
2017] RIGHTS OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS 1861 
 
calls to punish offensive speech and instead use the occurrence 
of that speech as a moment to teach and engage with their stu-
dents. Public colleges and universities are not powerless to ad-
dress speech that undermines their core mission and values. 
They can condemn speech that undermines that mission and 
use the unfortunate occasion of offensive speech as a teaching 
opportunity. 
